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Local Government Law
by R. Perry Sentell, Jr.*
Plaintiff filed an action against the county for the repeated flooding of
his home. The county attorney responded with a deft procedural
maneuver:
It was my bright idea to take the plaintiff's deposition at his home. My
timing was impeccable. During the deposition .... something on the

order of a ten-year storm [occurred], an event which flooded [plaintiff's]
property just as [he] had claimed. During our "adjournment" of the
deposition, ... I [was] captured on video [by plaintiff's attorney]
wading through plaintiff's front yard with my pants legs somewhere in
the vicinity of my knees!'
The "law" of local government, both decisional and statutory, indelibly
reflects its origins.
I.

A.

MUNICIPALITIES

Home Rule

Although enacted in 1965, the Georgia "Municipal Home Rule Act"2
continues to raise issues of first impression in the appellate courts.'
* Carter Professor of Law, University of Georgia (A.B., 1956; LL.B., 1958); Harvard
University (LL.M., 1961). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
Deep appreciation is expressed to the Carl Vinson Institute of Government of the
University of Georgia for summer research support which contributed most significantly
to the preparation of this survey.
1.

An account from R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAw: LITE 52 (1997).

For a general "profile" of Georgia local government law, those who practice it, and the
practice itself, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., A PROFILE: THE PEOPLE AND THE PRACTICE OF
GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAw (1996).

2. O.C.G.A. §§ 36-35-1 to -8 (1993 & Supp. 1998).
3. For background, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Home Rule Benefits or Homemade
Problems for Georgia Local Government? 4 GA. ST. B.J. 317 (1968); R. Perry Sentell, Jr.,
"Home Rule": Its Impact on GeorgiaLocal Government Law, 8 GA. ST. B.J. 277 (1972); R.
Perry Sentell, Jr., The United States Supreme Court as Home Rule Wrecker, 34 MERCER L.
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The issue of Kemp v. City of Claxton4 went to the Act's authorization of
citizen petitions initiating "amendments to or repeals of ordinances,
resolutions, or regulations."5 Specifically, the supreme court queried,
did that delegation permit petitions "to amend or repeal any ordinance,
resolution, or regulation enacted by the [municipal governing authority]"? 6 Reversing the trial judge, the court held the authorization is

confined to citizen petitions seeking "to amend the city charter, or repeal
an amendment to the charter."7
The court rested its conclusion upon several facets of the home rule
statute. As for "legislative intent," the statute's "primary purpose" was
"to authorize municipalities to amend their charters by their own
actions."8 Moreover, the petition authorization "is prefaced by a
statement that what follows are the methods by which a municipal
corporation may 'amend its charter."'" Finally, the Act's legislative
delegation power ran expressly to the municipal "governing authority."' ° That delegation's requisite "strict construction"1 restricted the
citizen petition procedure "only to amendments to municipal char-

REV. 363 (1982).
4. 269 Ga. 173, 496 S.E.2d 712 (1998).
5. Id. at 175, 496 S.E.2d at 715 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 36-35-3(b) (1993 & Supp. 1998)).
6. Id. The municipal governing authority had adopted ordinances closing two railroad
grade crossings inside the municipality. Plaintiffs claimed that the closings would reduce
customer access to certain businesses and submitted petitions for referendums on repealing
the ordinances. Upon the municipal clerk's refusal to accept the petitions, plaintiffs sought
a writ of mandamus, which the trial court issued. Id. at 173, 496 S.E.2d at 714.
7. Id. at 175, 496 S.E.2d at 715. "The petition procedure of OCGA § 36-35-3(b)(2)
applies only to amendments to municipal charters. Consequently, the superior court erred
in granting mandamus and requiring that the City Clerk accept and approve the petitions
at issue." Id. at 176, 496 S.E.2d at 716.
8. Id. at 175, 496 S.E.2d at 715. "The Act was passed under the authority of a 1954
amendment to the Constitution of the State of Georgia, which is currently found at Art. IX,
Sec. II, Par. II. Prior to the 1954 amendment and the Home Rule Act of 1965, city charters
were amendable only by acts of the General Assembly." Id.
9. Id. at 176, 496 S.E.2d at 715. "This also shows that the petition and referendum
provision is intended to be available only when the proposed amendment is intended to
affect a city charter." Id. The court reasoned that "a statute is to be read as a whole, and
the spirit and intent of the legislation prevails over a literal reading of the language ....
The legislative intent will be effectuated even if some language must be eliminated." Id.
at 175, 496 S.E.2d at 715.
10. Id. at 176, 496 S.E.2d at 716.
11. Id. "Municipal corporations are creations of the state, possessing only those powers
that have been granted to them, and allocations of power from the state are strictly
construed .... Municipal home rule power is a delegation of the General Assembly's
legislative power to the municipalities." Id., 496 S.E.2d at 715.
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ters." 2 It could not countenance an interpretation permitting the
electorate's direct exercise of "general legislative power." 3
B.

Dissolution

Of all the self-evident truths of municipal law, one is paramount: For
its continuing viability, a municipality must avoid dissolution. In 1993,
the Georgia General Assembly engaged the sensitive subject of municipal
dissolution 14 via a statute defining "inactive municipalities." 5 So
designated were municipalities failing to provide at least three of eleven
enumerated services, failing to hold at least six council meetings per
year, and failing to hold regular elections.' 6 The statute automatically
17
repealed the charters of inactive municipalities as of July 1, 1995;
thereafter, it empowers any citizen of such a municipality to bring an
action for "a declaration of the dissolution of the municipal corporation."1 8
Sherrer v. City of Pulaski 9 presented an effort under the statute to
dissolve a municipality allegedly failing to provide the requisite
services. 20 Rejecting that effort, the court of appeals relied upon the
municipal mayor's uncontradicted affidavit that the city had contracted

12.

Id., 496 S.E.2d at 716.

13. Id.
Under an interpretation of OCGA § 36-35-3(b)(2) that would allow the electorate
to petition for a referendum on all ordinances and resolutions, the electorate would
be exercising legislative power. As we must strictly construe the grant of
legislative power to the governing authority, we must reject plaintiffs' argument
that the electorate can directly exercise such general legislative power.

Id.
14. For a background discussion of all municipal territorial boundary procedures,
including the dissolution procedures prior to the 1993 statute, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr.,
Municipal De-Annexation: The Ins and the Outs, 27 GA. ST. B.J. 118 (1991).
15. O.C.G.A. § 36-30-7.1 (1993 & Supp. 1998). For notation of the statute's enactment
at the time, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government Law, 45 MERCER L. REV. 325, 360
(1993).
16. O.C.G.A. § 36-30-7.1(b)(1)-(3).
17. Id. § 36-30-7.1(e).
18. Id. § 36-30-7.1(j). "Any such action shall be brought in the superior court of the
county wherein the legal situs of the municipal corporation is located." Id.
19. 228 Ga. App. 78, 491 S.E.2d 129 (1997).
20. Plaintiff demanded that the city charter be dissolved and that a municipal
ordinance prohibiting the sale of beer and wine be declared void upon its face. Id. at 78,
491 S.E.2d at 130.
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for the county's performance of the services.2' As for plaintiff's charge
of insufficient contract consideration, the court emphasized the
agreement's provision that the county performed the services "'[i]n
consideration for the County's receipt of [the city's] one percent sales tax
program."'22
Accordingly, the court affirmed summary judgment
favoring the municipality's continued existence.23
C.

Annexation

Less disruptive than dissolution,24 municipal annexation is a far
more prevalent boundary-altering procedure.2 Because of annexation's
perceived impact upon municipal voting, the United States Supreme
Court early held the procedure subject to the preclearance strictures of
the 1965 Voting Rights Act.26 A municipal failure to meet those
strictures brought City of Arcade v. Emmons 27 before the Georgia
Supreme Court.
Emmons turned upon the status of a municipal election admittedly
held without federal preclearance of prior annexations, 2 an omission
that the trial court determined to vacate the election.29 On appeal, the

21. The mayor's affidavit stated that the municipality held regular meetings and
qualified elections and that it had contracted for the county's provision of law enforcement
services, road and street construction and maintenance, solid waste collection, and
recreational services. Id. at 79, 491 S.E.2d at 130.
22. Id. at 80, 491 S.E.2d at 131.
23. Id. The court termed "unpersuasive" the plaintiffs argument that under the
contract the county "is only agreeing to perform services it would have performed anyway
for citizens in [the unincorporated county]." Id.
24. For a review of all Georgia's municipal boundary procedures, see R. Perry Sentell,
Jr., MunicipalDe-Annexation: The Ins and Outs, 27 GA. ST. B.J. 118 (1991).
25. For perspective on the law of Georgia municipal annexation, see R. Perry Sentell,
Jr., The Law of Municipal Annexation in Georgia: The Evolution of a Concept?, 2 GA. L.
REV. 35 (1967); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Municipal Annexation in Georgia:Nay-Sayers Beware,
5 GA. L. REV. 499 (1971); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Municipal Annexation in Georgia: The
Contiguity Conundrum, 9 GA. L. REV. 167 (1974).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994). The statute requires that changes in voting practices and
procedures first be cleared by means of a declaratory judgment from the District Court for
the District of Columbia or by approval from the attorney general. For an account and an
analysis of the Court's decisions applying the statute to local governments, see R. Perry
Sentell, Jr., Federalizing Through the Franchise: The Supreme Court and Local
Government, 6 GA. L. REV. 34 (1971).
27. 268 Ga. 230, 486 S.E.2d 359 (1997).
28. Persons residing in the annexed areas had admittedly voted in the election. Id. at
230, 486 S.E.2d at 360.
29. Id. at 231, 486 S.E.2d at 360.
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supreme court expressly disapproved the municipality's actions, but
insisted that "'[o]rdering new elections is a drastic remedy."'3 ° For at
least three reasons, the court maintained that remedy was excessive in
this case: the elected individuals held their offices for only two years, 3'
there was no discriminatory purpose,32 and the city had subsequently
obtained federal approval of the annexations. 3 Accordingly, the court
reversed the trial judge's vacation of the election.34
D.

Officers and Employees

Once again this year, municipal officers and employees constituted
prolific sources of diverse litigation. Drawing a largely procedural
disposition, Police Benevolent Ass'n v. Brown35 featured an action
brought by an association and seven police officers. Plaintiffs sought to
mandamus the city manager to recognize the association as the police
bargaining representative and to bargain with it under a specified set of
"guidelines."
Emphasizing the association's unclear status,36 the
supreme court held it was without standing to seek "the harsh remedy"
of mandamus.37 As for the officers' action, the court found the record
barren of any ordinance containing the alleged bargaining "guide-

30. Id. at 233, 486 S.E.2d at 362 (quoting United States v. City of Houston, 800 F.
Supp. 504, 506 (S.D. Tex. 1992)).
31. Thus, those officers should have already served their terms by the time the trial
court's order was entered. Id. at 230-31, 486 S.E.2d at 360.
32. "[T]he facts of this case do not present the sort of egregious situations justifying the
setting aside of an election." Id. at 234, 486 S.E.2d at 363.
33. "The City having now obtained after-the-fact approval of the challenged
annexations, we hold that the matter is thus at an end." Id.
34. Id.
35. 268 Ga. 26, 486 S.E.2d 28 (1997).
36. The association had failed to show that it would gain "a material advantage" from
issuance of a writ of mandamus; it had "no standing to seek the writ of mandamus it filed
with the seven officers." Id. at 27, 486 S.E.2d at 29.
37. "Mandamus is 'a harsh remedy' and should not be granted unless the applicant
would be afforded a material advantage by its grant ...or has suffered 'special damages.'
Id. at 26, 486 S.E.2d at 29. For the history and applicability of the writ of mandamus in
the context of local government law, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., MISCASTING MANDAMUS
IN GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW (1989). As indicated by its title, the monograph
stresses petitioners' inordinately inappropriate and excessive appeal to the writ as a means
of righting perceived wrongs in local government administration.
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lines."3 8 The city manager could not be ordered "to comply with the
terms of an ordinance not properly before the court."39

The court of appeals likewise assumed a procedural focus in Webb v.
City of Atlanta.40 There, the municipality had suspended plaintiff's
workers' compensation payments on grounds that he also received
benefits under a city-sponsored disability plan. 4' The court held that
the unappealed award of workers' compensation payments precluded the
city from later raising the disability-plan benefits.42 Otherwise, the
court reasoned, there had been no change in plaintiff's physical condition
or wage-earning capacity and thus no legitimate ground for suspending
his workers' compensation payments.4 3
Workers' benefits also propelled the controversy over the validity of a
municipal ordinance in City of Atlanta v. Morgan. 4 That ordinance
provided insurance benefits for city employee dependents registered
under yet another ordinance as "domestic partners."45 Appraising

38. 268 Ga. at 27, 486 S.E.2d at 29. "The proper method of proving a city ordinance
is by production of the original or of a properly certified copy." Id. Later in the survey
period, the court of appeals employed this same principle to reverse the conviction of one
for violating a municipal "public drunk ordinance." Poole v. State, 229 Ga. App. 406, 494
S.E.2d 251 (1997). Although the record evidence clearly showed the defendant was in fact
intoxicated in a public place, "'[in the absence in evidence of a properly admissible copy
of the ordinance involved, neither the trial court nor this court may take judicial notice of
the existence of a local ordinance.'" Id. at 409, 494 S.E.2d at 254 (quoting Dudley v. State,
161 Ga. App. 310, 311, 287 S.E.2d 763, 764 (1982)).
39. 268 Ga. at 27, 486 S.E.2d at 30. The court thus affirmed the trial judge's refusal
to issue the mandamus. Id. at 28, 486 S.E.2d at 30.
40. 228 Ga. App. 278, 491 S.E.2d 492 (1997).
41. For background on municipal workers' compensation law, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr.,
Workers' Compensation in Georgia Municipal Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 57 (1980).
42. The municipality had failed to raise the disability benefits issue during the workers'
compensation hearing and had failed to appeal the award. "An unappealed award of total
disability payments 'is res judicata as to the existence of such disability and the
compensation due thereunder.'" 228 Ga. App. at 280, 491 S.E.2d at 494 (quoting Pacific
Employers Ins. Co. v. Shoemake, 105 Ga. App. 432, 432, 124 S.E.2d 653, 654 (1962)).
43. The court relied upon O.C.G.A. section 34-9-104(a) as controlling the "change in
condition" issue. "Although the superior court found that increases in disability plan
payments could constitute improvements in economic condition, neither it nor the City has
cited any authority showing such payments affect a claimant's wage-earning capacity." 228
Ga. App. at 280-81, 491 S.E.2d at 494. The court thus reversed judgment for the city. Id.
at 281, 491 S.E.2d at 494.
44. 268 Ga. 586, 492 S.E.2d 193 (1997).
45. The registry ordinance, the court observed, had been declared constitutional in City
of Atlanta v. McKinney, 265 Ga. 161, 454 S.E.2d 517 (1995). In McKinney the court had
held a former benefits ordinance invalid as treating domestic partners as a family relation,
analogizing to a spouse, "thereby expanding the definition of 'dependent' in a manner
inconsistent with State law and in violation of both the Georgia Constitution and OCGA
§ 36-35-6(b)." 268 Ga. at 587, 492 S.E.2d at 194.
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challengers' contentions that the benefits ordinance was precluded by an
existing general statute (the Municipal Home Rule Act),46 the court
observed that the general statute failed to define the term "dependent."47 The benefits ordinance was thus free to define "dependent" as
one "'who is supported, in whole or in part, by the employee's earnings'
and who uses such contributions to maintain his or her standard of
living. " "4 Consequently, the court concluded, the benefits ordinance
was consistent with the general statute and the Georgia Constitution.4 9
Employee termination confronted the court of appeals in City of
Atlanta v. Smith.5 ° Specifically, the case dealt with the city's termination of a police officer for paying confiscated money to an informant and
Adopting an "any evidence" standard for
filing a false report.5
reviewing the civil service board's dismissal,52 the court first held the
officer's plea of entrapment unavailable in this civil proceeding.53 As

46. Plaintiffs argued that the Home Rule Act, O.C.G.A. section 36-35-4(a), authorizes
municipalities to provide insurance benefits to employees and their dependents; thus,
plaintiffs contended, the benefits ordinance was a special law as prohibited by the Georgia
Constitution. GA. CONST. art. III, § 6, para. 4(a) and (c).
47. "Although this section of the Municipal Home Rule Act grants specific authority to
provide such benefits to the dependents of a municipal employee, it does not provide a
definition of the term 'dependent.'" 268 Ga. at 587, 492 S.E.2d at 194.
48. Id. at 589, 492 S.E.2d at 196 (quoting Atlanta Ordinance 96-0-1018). The court
emphasized that the municipality "followed our holding in McKinney and carefully avoided
the constitutional flaw in its previous benefits ordinance by eliminating from Ordinance
96-0-1018's definition of 'dependent' any language recognizing any new family relationship
similar to marriage." Id. at 588, 492 S.E.2d at 195.
49. Id. at 590, 492 S.E.2d at 196. A dissenting opinion by Justice Carley, joined by
Justice Thompson, charged the majority with construing the registry ordinance much
broader than the McKinney interpretation and "as creating a legal right to insurance
coverage as a 'dependent' under OCGA § 36-35-4(a) .... With regard to the creation of
legal rights arising from domestic relations, the general state law of marriage and divorce
preempts the municipal domestic partnership benefits ordinance." Id. at 591, 492 S.E.2d
at 197 (Carley, J., dissenting).
50. 228 Ga. App. 864, 493 S.E.2d 51 (1997).
51. On a tip from an informant that an officer was paying confiscated drug money to
the informant, the city set up a sting operation that caught the officer. The city civil
service board had affirmed the officer's dismissal, but the superior court had reversed. Id.
at 865, 493 S.E.2d at 52.
52. The court expressly overruled its own decisions distinguishing between "any
evidence" and "substantial evidence" and followed the supreme court's decision in Emory
University v. Levitas, 260 Ga. 894, 401 S.E.2d 691 (1991), that "the substantial-evidence
standard is effectively the same as the any-evidence standard." 228 Ga. App. at 865, 493
S.E.2d at 53. Thus, "we are required to reverse the superior court if there was any
evidence to support the Board's decision." Id. at 867, 493 S.E.2d at 53.
53. Id. at 867, 493 S.E.2d at 53. Rejecting applicability of an exception when the
proceeding could result in a licensee's loss of the right to engage in a profession, the court
reasoned that here the officer "was not deprived ... of a license to engage in a given
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for alleged due process violations, the court upheld the board's decision
that the sting operation lacked sufficient outrageousness: "[T]here is no
evidence that [the city's informant] did more than inform [the officer] of
the dealer's location and encourage him to hurry to the scene."54 The
court thus reversed the trial judge's order of reinstatement.5 5
E. Recall
On two significant occasions, the supreme court revisited the
controversial issue of municipal recall.5 " Davis v. Shavers 7 featured
an official's libel action for statements made against him in an unsuccessful recall application." Upon the court of appeals decision that the
statements enjoyed only a conditional privilege,59 the supreme court
granted certiorari to resolve the issue. Approaching the matter from
dual perspectives, the court first rejected assimilation of the recall
procedure and court pleadings.6 ° "[T]he recall procedure is not a
'judicial' or even 'official' procedure, but is political in nature, and the
issue to be determined is of a political character."61 As for "public
policy," the court reasoned that public officials should not be left without
"remedy for allegedly libelous statements made with actual malice in the

profession, but was rather terminated from a particular job." Id. at 866, 493 S.E.2d at 53.
54. Id. at 867, 493 S.E.2d at 54. "There is no evidence that the informant during these
conversations encouraged [the officer] to file a false arrest report." Id.
In yet another police misconduct instance of the survey period, Dudley v. State, 230 Ga.
App. 339, 496 S.E.2d 341 (1998), a police chief was convicted of three simple batteries for
using pepper spray in attempting to arrest four individuals. Reviewing the chiefs
supersedeas bond requirements as set by the trial judge, the court held that a total
prohibition on working in law enforcement was excessive and that other restrictions on the
chiefs conduct (e.g., no bail bonding, dog training, or private investigations and a curfew
and banishment from the county) were "totally unrelated to the offense for which the
defendant was convicted and are, therefore, unreasonable as a matter of law." Id. at 341,
496 S.E.2d at 343.
55. 228 Ga. App. at 867, 493 S.E.2d at 54.
56. For perspective, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Remembering Recall in Local Government
Law, 10 GA. L. REV. 883 (1976).
57. 269 Ga. 75, 495 S.E.2d 23 (1998).
58. For background on the defamation action in Georgia local government law, see R.
Perry Sentell, Jr., Defamation in GeorgiaLocal Government Law: A BriefHistory, 16 GA.
L. REV. 627 (1982).
59. Davis v. Shavers, 225 Ga. App. 497, 500, 484 S.E.2d 243, 247 (1997).
60. Defendants argued application of O.C.G.A. section 51-5-8, conferring an absolute
privilege upon official court documents. Id. at 498, 484 S.E.2d at 246.
61. 269 Ga. at 76, 495 S.E.2d at 24. The court observed that the recall statute
(O.C.G.A. section 21-4-6) "provides for only limited judicial review of the legal sufficiency
of the recall application, and prohibits discovery or evidentiary hearings and any
determination of the truth of the statements in the application." Id.
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context of a procedure having only the slightest hint of a judicial
nature."62 Accordingly, the court affirmed that, in a defamation action,
recall application statements enjoy only a conditional privilege. 3
The second occasion, Phillips v. Hawthorne,' went directly to the
recall application's content-allegations that the officials committed a
crime by holding a closed meeting on abolishing the municipal police
department. The trial judge held those allegations legally insufficient
for failing to specify dates and places and for failing to allege both the
presence of a quorum and wilful violation of the Open Meetings Act.6"
Charging the judge with an "inappropriately restrictive reading" of its
prior decisions 6 the supreme court tendered the following admonishment:67 "Recall applications are not criminal indictments. They are
not drawn by prosecutors; they need not be written by lawyers." 8
These allegations, the court emphasized, "were necessarily premised on
the presence of a quorum at a meeting held in wilful and voluntary
violation of the Act."69 Otherwise, "there could have been no 'meeting'
that constituted a 'crime' under the statutory definitions set forth in the
Act."70 Likewise, for dates and places: "The requisite information
identifying the meeting was provided here not by date or location but by
the controversial subject matter that was allegedly discussed at the

62. Id. Although recognizing "the importance that criticism of the conduct of public
officials plays in the administration of their offices," the court concluded that defendants
'are entitled to the protection of a conditional privilege only." Id. at 76-77, 495 S.E.2d at
25.
63. Id. at 77, 495 S.E.2d at 25. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Fletcher charged the
court with unnecessarily eroding the right of recall. He maintained that the decision "will
have a chilling effect on political speech," and that "the recall statute already provides
sufficient safeguards to protect elected officials from false allegations." Id. (Fletcher, J.,
dissenting).
64. 269 Ga. 9, 494 S.E.2d 656 (1998).
65. O.C.G.A. §§ 50-14-1 to -6 (1998). For background on open meetings and public
records, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., The Omen of "Openness" in Local Government Law, 13
GA. L. REv. 97 (1978).
66. 269 Ga. at 10, 494 S.E.2d at 657. The court identified that decision as Davis v.
Shavers, 263 Ga. 785, 439 S.E.2d 650 (1994), a decision, the court maintained, in which the
issue was "whether the facts in the recall applications were sufficient under the particular
circumstances of that case to provide" adequate notice. 269 Ga. at 12, 494 S.E.2d at 658.
67. The court cited as setting the procedure for the trial judge's review the following
provision of the recall statute: O.C.G.A. section 21-4-6(f).
68. 269 Ga. at 14, 494 S.E.2d at 659.
69. Id. at 13, 494 S.E.2d at 659. "We reject the implication that a recall application is
legally insufficient for using terms the definitions of which are established by statutes
referenced in the application." Id. at 14, 494 S.E.2d at 659.
70. Id.
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meeting."7' Finally, the court asserted, the recall allegations "were
sufficiently specific to place the public72 and [officials] on notice of the
substance of [the citizens'] complaint."
F

Regulation
The scope of municipal regulatory power ranged from the esoteric to
the exotic-from Vietnamese potbellied pigs to lingerie modeling studios.
In both settings, moreover, the power prevailed.7 3
City of Lilburn v. Sanchez74 focused upon the constitutionality of a
municipal ordinance requiring a lot of at least one acre in size for
keeping a Vietnamese potbellied pig. 75 Under the "rational basis"
constitutional standard, the supreme court stated the test was whether
the ordinance was substantially related to the public health, safety, or
general welfare.7" Reviewing expert testimony on health hazards
associated with the animal,77 the court deemed the lot size requirement
to satisfy at least two legitimate municipal interests. 7' First, the
ordinance would control the overall size of the municipality's pig

71. Id., 494 S.E.2d at 660. The court emphasized the small size and population of the
municipality, reasoning that "ilt is no great stretch to acknowledge that even in a much
larger city such conduct would create great controversy." Id.
72. Id. A three-justice dissent complained that the court's "analysis appears to say that
controversial matters require less specificity in recall petitions than mundane matters."
Id. at 16, 494 S.E.2d at 661 (Benham, C.J., dissenting). The dissent elaborated as follows:

What we need in this area is some minimum, easily ascertainable standard that
is clear and unequivocal to citizens who avail themselves of the recall process, to
elected officials and to a reviewing court. What we do not need is some
amorphous standard that changes with each shifting political wind or issue.
Id.

73. For treatment of the municipal regulatory power in an assortment of contexts, see
R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Discretion in Georgia Local Government Law, 8 GA. L. REV. 614
(1974); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Reasoning by Riddle: The Power to Prohibit in GeorgiaLocal
Government Law, 9 GA. L. REV. 115 (1974); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government Law
and Liquor Licensing: A Sobering Vignette, 15 GA. L. REV. 1039 (1981); R. Perry Sentell,
Jr., "AscertainableStandards"vs. "UnbridledDiscretion"in Local Government Regulation,
GA. COUNTY Gov. MAG. (Dec. 1989).
74. 268 Ga. 520, 491 S.E.2d 353 (1997).

75. Challengers' home was located on a .24 acre lot in a municipal subdivision; thus,
their keeping of the pig as a household pet violated the ordinance. Id. at 520, 491 S.E.2d
at 354.

76. Id. at 522, 491 S.E.2d at 355. The standard "does not require that an ordinance
adopt the best, or even the least intrusive, means available to achieve its objective." Id.
77. Evidence showed that the smell emanating from the pigs was much stronger than
that from dogs and cats and that the pigs generated manure in quantities four times
greater than dogs. Id. at 522-23, 491 S.E.2d at 356.
78. Id. at 523-24, 491 S.E.2d at 356.
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population; 79 and second, it would dissipate the pig's impact over a
greater area, thus minimizing the effects upon neighbors."0 Consequently,
the court concluded, the city had validly exercised its police
8
power. '
The regulatory setting of Quetgles v. City of Columbus 2 reflected the
municipal concern of recent years with adult entertainment establishments. There, a city ordinance prohibited one-on-one modeling sessions
in lingerie studios and distanced the business from other establishments.
Upon constitutional challenge, 3 the supreme court found sufficient
municipal consideration of specific evidence of "secondary effects." 4
Based on concerns with property values and criminal activities, the
ordinance was "content-neutral";s and it met the "tripartite test""6 for
restrictions upon expression. The court likewise rejected plaintiffs'
"taking" argument: the ordinance did not eliminate but only regulated. 7 Finally, the court viewed the ordinance as providing objective
standards so as to meet due process requirements 8 and escaping the
invidious discrimination prohibition of equal protection. 9

79.

There was a finite number of one-acre lots within the municipality. Id. at 523, 491

S.E.2d at 356.
80. 268 Ga. at 523-24, 491 S.E.2d at 356. "Fairly debatable questions as to the
ordinance's reasonableness, wisdom, and propriety ...remain within the sound discretion
of city leaders." Id. at 524, 491 S.E.2d at 357.
81. Id. A dissenting opinion for two justices maintained that the court had failed to
employ the proper "clearly erroneous" standard of review and thus "ha[d] substituted its
judgment for that of the trial court." Id. at 527, 491 S.E.2d at 359 (Carley, J., dissenting).
82. 268 Ga. 619, 491 S.E.2d 778 (1997).
83. The trial court had granted summary judgment for the municipality. Id. at 619,
491 S.E.2d at 779.
84. Id., 491 S.E.2d at 780. These consisted of affidavits and supporting materials
relating to increased crime and a decrease in property values.
85. Id. at 620, 491 S.E.2d at 780.
86. This test is derived from Paramount Pictures Corp. v.Busbee, 250 Ga. 252, 297
S.E.2d 250 (1982). Under it, the ordinance will prevail "(1) if it furthers an important
governmental interest; (2) if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
speech; and (3) if the incidental restriction of speech is no greater than necessary to the
furtherance of the governmental interest." 268 Ga. at 620-21, 491 S.E.2d at 780.
87. Id. at 621, 491 S.E.2d at 781. "[Tlhe procurement of a business license does not,
by itself, give the license holder vested rights." Id.
88. Id.
89. Id., 491 S.E.2d at 781-82. "The ordinance targets not just one-on-one modeling, but
any one-on-one activity between customers and employees where the employees display
their bodies in order to excite customers sexually." Id. at 622, 491 S.E.2d at 781. The
court thus affirmed the trial judge's summary judgment for the municipality.
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Contracts

The court of appeals resolved municipal contract disputes in three
distinctly different subject matter contexts. MunicipalElectricAuthority
of Georgia v. City of Calhoun9° featured a disagreement over the terms
of a contract between a municipality and its nonprofit wholesale electric
supplier.9 Siding with the municipality, the court held the trial judge
not "clearly erroneous" in finding an overcharge for "certain bulk power
and energy."92 The contract's reference to "methodology," the court
held, alluded to the system by which the supplier could determine the
quantity of excess capacity and not to the rate schedule.9" Accordingly,
the contract permitted the supplier to unilaterally change the method
used for determining quantity, but it did not allow the supplier's
unilateral change of the price for that quantity.94
In World Championship Wrestling, Inc. v. City of Macon,95 the city
found itself codefendant to an action by one injured while attending a
wrestling event at the municipal coliseum. The municipality then crossclaimed against the event's promoter, suing under the indemnification
clause of the city's coliseum lease to the promoter.9" Affirming summary judgment for the city, the court construed the lease to include the

90. 227 Ga. App. 571, 489 S.E.2d 599 (1997).
91. Id. at 571, 489 S.E.2d at 601. The parties had dealt with each other over a period
of more than twenty years and through a series of contracts. Id. at 571-72, 489 S.E.2d at
601-03.
92. Id. at 571, 489 S.E.2d at 601.
93. Id. at 572, 489 S.E.2d at 602. This 1987 contract resulted from the overestimation
of the demand for electric power by participants in the program. It provided a method for
determining a participant's excess allotment and for disposing of the excess capacity. The
agreement stated that "[tihe Participant and the Authority agree that this methodology
shall be used for the sale and purchase of excess capacity and energy until such time as
changed upon thirty days prior written notice from the Authority to the Participant.'" Id.
94. The court agreed with the trial judge that "if any term of the contract is amendable
at the will of MEAG, the entire contract would be void for vagueness because there could
be no assent of the parties to the terms of the contract." Id. at 573, 489 S.E.2d at 602.
Additionally, "it is logical to expect that calculations regarding excess capacity may be
subject to differing methodologies. This is not so with the price, which was negotiated and
agreed to by the parties." Id., 489 S.E.2d at 603.
95. 229 Ga. App. 248, 493 S.E.2d 629 (1997).
96. Id. at 248, 493 S.E.2d at 630.

1998]

LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW

275

concession area where the injury occurred. 97 Additionally, the court
98
held the indemnification agreement was not violative of public policy.
Municipal failure to comply with the notice requirement of the Solid
Waste Management Act 9 culminated in City of Arcade v. Emmons' °
and the court's invalidation of the city's contract with a private
developer for a proposed landfill. 01
Under the Act, the court held
proper notice of the council meeting at which the contract was actually
executed was insufficient. 1°2 Rather, the Act required notice of a
previous council meeting that began the process which eventually
resulted in the siting decision.' 3 Admittedly, the municipality provided no notice of that crucial
meeting, a failure fatal to the validity of the
10 4
subsequent contract.

97. Id. at 250, 493 S.E.2d at 631. Reasoning that construction of a contract is a
question of law for the court, the court viewed the only evidence regarding the leased
'arena" to be testimony by the coliseum's general manager which "clearly indicates that
the leased space includes the space in which [plaintiff] was injured." Id.
98. Id. at 249, 493 S.E.2d at 630. "Although such a clause standing alone might be
against public policy pursuant to OCGA § 13-8-2(b), combined with the lease provision
requiring insurance, the lease validly 'shifts the risk of loss to the insurance company
regardless of which party is at fault.'" Id. (quoting McAbee Constr. Co. v. Kraft Co., 178
Ga. App. 496, 498, 343 S.E.2d 513, 515 (1986)). This was true even though the lessee never
purchased the insurance and the municipality was thus enforcing the indemnification
clause directly against the lessee. The court relied upon Myers v. Texaco Refining Co., 205
Ga. App. 292, 422 S.E.2d 216 (1992).
99. O.C.G.A. § 12-8-26(b) (1996).
100. 228 Ga. App. 879, 494 S.E.2d 186 (1997).
101. Id. at 879, 494 S.E.2d at 191. The trial court had invalidated the contract and
permanently enjoined the municipality from taking any actions in conjunction with the
private developer with regard to the decision to site the landfill on the subject property.
Id. at 880, 494 S.E.2d at 188.
102. Id. at 884, 494 S.E.2d at 191. The court observed that the Act "makes clear that
a siting decision is not necessarily limited to the actual execution of the contract pertaining
to the location of the landfill." Id.
103. 'The City's properly noticed meeting on November 16, at which the contract was
formally executed, was not sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement for public notice
prior to action resulting in a siting decision." Id.
104. The court did, however, reverse the trial court's permanent injunction against the
city:
The City's failure to hold a properly noticed meeting pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 12-826(b) rendered its siting decision and contract with [the developer] invalid, but
that failure does not prevent the City from subsequently holding a properly
noticed meeting for public discussion of a new siting decision and consideration of
a new agreement with [the developer] for the operation of a landfill on the same
site.
Id. at 885, 494 S.E.2d at 191.
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H. Taxation
Characterized by the court of appeals as a "complex case," Jackson v.

City of College Park115 presented a controversy over the distribution of

special local option sales tax proceeds." 6 Specifically, the issue went
to the state revenue commissioner's power to impose a distribution
formula within a county 0 7 when one city there claimed "absent
municipality" status0 . and the remaining municipalities failed to
reach a valid distribution agreement.0 9 Essentially, the court responded by denying the commissioner any formulation power at all."0
Rather, the court delineated, the applicable "statutory scheme" requires
the remaining municipalities to renegotiate their distribution agreement."' If unable to do so, the municipalities must submit their
dispute "'to nonbinding arbitration, mediation, or such other means of
resolving conflicts.""' 2 Finally, should no resolution materialize, the
municipal "power to levy the tax may terminate." 3

105. 230 Ga. App. 487, 487, 496 S.E.2d 777, 778 (1998).
106. As of 1994, the court emphasized, the local option sales tax statute, O.C.G.A.
section 48-8-89(b), included "a list of criteria the governments should consider when
negotiating the distribution agreements." Id. at 487, 496 S.E.2d at 778.
107. In issue was the Revenue Department's effort to distribute tax revenues to all the
cities in the tax district (the county) based only on "the proportion of each city's population
to the population of all cites in the district." Id. at 488, 496 S.E.2d at 778.
108. A city may make such an election under O.C.G.A. section 48-8-89(b).
109. 230 Ga. App. at 489, 496 S.E.2d at 778. Their agreement failed to allocate the
requisite amount to the absent municipality. Id., 496 S.E.2d at 779.
110. "[Tlhe Revenue Department had no statutory power to impose on the county and
cities its own distribution plan." Id., 496 S.E.2d at 779.
111. "[T]he governments were statutorily required to renegotiate their agreement and
file it with the Revenue Commissioner .... Id.
112. Id.
OCGA § 48-8-89(d)(3) provides that, when the governments fail to agree to a
certificate of distribution within a 60-day period, they must submit their dispute
to "nonbinding arbitration, mediation, or such other means of resolving conflicts
in a manner which, in the judgment of the commissioner, reflects a good faith
effort to resolve the dispute."
Id. at 491, 496 S.E.2d at 780. Under the precept of ejusdem generis, the court held, the
italicized language required a type of resolution that did not involve coercive relief or rule
by decree or flat. Id. For discussion of the Georgia appellate courts' penchant for
employing this maxim of statutory construction, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., The Canons of
Constructionin Georgia:"Anachronisms"in Action, 25 GA. L. REV. 365 (1991), reprintedin
R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., STUDIES IN GEORGIA STATUTORY LAW 185, 212 (1997).
113. 230 Ga. App. at 491, 496 S.E.2d at 781. "The incentive to negotiate is not the
threat that a judge or Revenue Department will decide the issue; rather, if the parties
reach no agreement their power to levy the tax may terminate. See OCGA § 48-8-89(d)(7)."
Id., 496 S.E.2d at 780-81.
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Liability

The "general rule" holds the Georgia municipality immune from
liability for torts committed by its officers and employees. 14 A tradi-

tional exception to that immunity holds the municipality responsible for
negligence in the maintenance of its streets and sidewalks. 115 An
exception to the exception, in turn, precludes city liability for defects in
portions of the county or state highway system lying within municipal
limits." 6
Unless the city constructed or agreed to maintain the
system, it escapes tort responsibility for those defects." 7 Two cases of
the survey period featured controversy over that escape potential.
In Williams v. City of Social Circle,"' an action for injuries on a
defective sidewalk, the city supported its motion for summary judgment
with affidavits that the sidewalk lay within a state highway right-of-way
not under the city's maintenance." 9 In opposition, plaintiff proffered
the city clerk's alleged admission of municipal responsibility. 2 °
Discounting the admission as hearsay 2 ' from one who was not the

In Jamestown Associates v. Fulton County Board of Tax Assessors, 228 Ga. App. 360,492
S.E.2d 1 (1997), one of the property tax cases of the survey period, plaintiff property owner
contended that the property became property of the city (and thus came off the county's tax
rolls) on the date plaintiff filed an inverse condemnation action against the city (1991), and
not the subsequent date upon which the city purchased the property from the plaintiff
(1994). Rejecting that argument, the court of appeals held ad valorem taxes to be based
on record title and that plaintiff "failed to offer any Georgia authority showing that by
filing an action based on inverse condemnation, legal title vested retroactively in the City."
Id. at 361, 492 S.E.2d at 2. For treatment of taxable interests for purposes of ad valorem
taxation, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., CaesarConfronts Caesar: Local Government Property
Taxation and Local Government Property,31 MERCER L. REV. 293 (1979).

114. For orientation, perspective, and a general chronology on the tort responsibility
of municipalities in Georgia, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL TORT
LIABILITY IN GEORGIA (4th ed. 1988); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Georgia Local Government Tort
Liability: The "Crisis"Conundrum, 2 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 19 (1985); R. Perry Sentell, Jr.,
Local Government Tort Liability: The Summer of '92, 9 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 405 (1993).
115. O.C.G.A. § 32-4-93(a) (1996). See R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL
TORT LIABILITY IN GEORGIA 62 (4th ed. 1988).
116. O.C.G.A. § 32-4-93(b). See R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL TORT
LIABILITY IN GEORGIA 116 (4th ed. 1988).
117. O.C.G.A. § 32-4-93(b) (1996).
118. 225 Ga. App. 746, 484 S.E.2d 687 (1997).
119. The affidavits were from the city clerk and the city utilities superintendent. Id.
at 747, 484 S.E.2d at 688.
120. Id. Plaintiff offered a claims manager's deposition that the clerk admitted the
accident occurred on city property and that the city accepted responsibility for it. Id.
121. The court reasoned that plaintiff "has not shown that they are admissible under
any recognized exception to the rule against hearsay." Id. at 749, 484 S.E.2d at 689.
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city's alter ego 122 and finding no evidence of "[any city] duty to maintain the sidewalk,"'2 324the court of appeals affirmed summary judgment
for the municipality.

The municipality enjoyed less success on the issue in City of Social
Circle v.Sims, 125 an action for injuries in a highway mishap "just
inside the City limits." 26 Again, the municipality moved for summary

judgment on grounds that "the accident occurred on a county road it had
not assumed an obligation to maintain." 27 Elaborating a general
municipal responsibility for annexed public streets, 28 the court
perused statutory definitions of both county and municipal public ways.
Those definitions, considered in light of evidence in the case, raised
general issues of material fact for a jury trial,'129 issues fatal to summary judgment for the city.'3 °
Another effort at avoiding tort immunity seeks to charge the
municipality with maintaining a nuisance.'
Hibbs v. City of Riverdale"32 instanced that effort via the charge of repeated flooding to
plaintiffs' homes from a drainage pond constructed by a subdivision

122. "Unlike a corporation's president, the city clerk in this case cannot be considered
the alter ego of the city." Id. at 748, 484 S.E.2d at 689.
123. Id. at 749, 484 S.E.2d at 690.
124. Id. Presiding Judge McMurray dissented, arguing that the clerk's statement "is
admissible to estop the defendant municipal corporation from denying it accepted
responsibility for any liability to plaintiff." Id. (McMurray, J., dissenting). For analysis
of and perspective on the estoppel precept in this context, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., THE
DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL IN GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW (1985).

125. 228 Ga. App. 582, 492 S.E.2d 240 (1997).
126. Id. at 583, 492 S.E.2d at 241. Plaintiff drove off a curve and alleged defects in the
road's design and maintenance. Id. at 582, 492 S.E.2d at 241.
127. Id. at 582, 492 S.E.2d at 241.
128. The court noted that the county and state had constructed the road in 1958 and
that its surrounding territory was annexed into the municipality in 1972. Id. at 583, 492
S.E.2d at 241. The court also observed that the case was not subject to O.C.G.A. section
36-36-7(c) (1993): "Whenever a municipality annexes land on both sides of a county road
right of way, the annexing municipality shall assume the ownership, control, care, and
maintenance of such right of way unless the municipality and the county agree otherwise
by joint resolution." Id. at 583 n.1, 492 S.E.2d at 241 n.1.
129. "At trial, the jury must review the evidence in light of OCGA § 32-4-1(2) and 32-42(a) and (f) to determine which entity owned the stretch of road at issue." Id. at 583, 492
S.E.2d at 241.

130. Id.
131.

For discussion of nuisance liability in Georgia local government law, see R. PERRY

SENTELL, JR., THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY IN GEORGIA 117

(4th ed. 1988); R.

Perry Sentell, Jr., Municipal Liability in Georgia: The "Nuisance"Nuisance, 12 GA. ST.
B.J. 11 (1975); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Georgia County Liability: Nuisance or Not?, 43
MERCER L. REV. 1 (1991).

132.

227 Ga. App. 889, 490 S.E.2d 436 (1997).
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developer. 133 The issue for decision was whether the municipality had
impliedly accepted responsibility for maintaining the pond."' The
court of appeals found no such acceptance from the facts that the city (1)
required the developer to build the drainage system according to
code, 35 (2) inspected construction of the system, ss (3) investigated
complaints of pond flooding, 137 and (4) required the developer to post
a maintenance bond. 3 Affirming defendant's summary judgment, the
court reasoned that "no evidence shows 39 the City 'maintained' or
'controlled' the nuisance drainage system."
The nuisance action is also vulnerable to traditional tort defenses. In
City Council of Augusta v. Booker,"4 for example, the court rejected
nuisance contentions that a power pole and overgrown grass at an
intersection obstructed a child's view of a stop sign and the car that
struck him.14 ' Relying upon depositions that the child "was aware of
the stop sign and chose to ignore it," 4 2 the court asserted that "the
placement of the pole or the condition of the lot was not the proximate
cause of [the child's] accident." 43 Plaintiff suffered similar disposition
in Goodman v. City of Smyrna, 4 4 a nuisance action for the death of a

133. In Hibbs v. City of Riverdale, 267 Ga. 337, 478 S.E.2d 121 (1996), the supreme
court held that a municipality could be responsible in nuisance for repeated flooding
damage but remanded the case to the court of appeals for a determination on whether
material issues of fact existed as to the city's acceptance of the drainage system so as to
establish a municipal duty. Id. at 338-39, 478 S.E.2d at 122-23.
134. "[A] city does not assume responsibility for a property dedicated to public use
unless it has accepted that dedication, and such acceptance may be direct or implied." 227
Ga. App. at 890, 490 S.E.2d at 437.
135. '[Tlhat exercise of regulatory power does not make the City responsible for
maintaining the development." Id., 490 S.E.2d at 438.
136. Id.
137. "We do not believe the mere fact that the City investigated the problem shows [the
City] exercised any 'dominion or control' over the property." Id.
138. "[The requirement that a developer post a maintenance bond for the benefit of
subdivision residents and the public does not create an inference that the City exercised
control of the stormwater drainage systems." Id. at 891, 490 S.E.2d at 438.
139. Id.
140. 229 Ga. App. 566, 494 S.E.2d 374 (1997).
141. Id. at 567, 494 S.E.2d at 376. The five-year-old child had darted through an
intersection on his bicycle and was struck by a motorist who had the right of way. Id. at
566, 494 S.E.2d at 375.
142. Id. at 567, 494 S.E.2d at 376. There were depositions by both the child and his
sister, who was riding with him. As for other, and contradictory, statements by the child,
the court noted that "a party's self-conflicting testimony is to be construed against him
unless a reasonable explanation for the contradiction is offered." Id.
143. Id. The court reversed the trial judge's denial of the municipality's motion for
summary judgment. Id. at 568, 494 S.E.2d at 377.
144. 230 Ga. App. 630, 497 S.E.2d 372 (1998).
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child who roller-skated down the incline of a city street and into the
drop-off of a rocky creek bed.'45 Stressing evidence on the obviousness
of the condition and the child's experience, 4 ' the court held the case
one "'in which a minor below the age of147
fourteen may be deemed to have
assumed the risk as a matter of law.'"

Yet another immunity-skirting tactic, the action for "constitutional
tort" 4 ' emerged in Maxwell v. Mayor & Aldermen of Savannah.49
There, a former police officer charged both the police chief and the city
governing authority with violating due process by wrongfully terminating his employment. 5 ° Affirming summary judgment for the governing authority, the court held that final disciplinary power rested with
the police chief.'
Additionally, plaintiff's evidence showed city
"policy" to allow terminations "only for cause."'52 As for plaintiff's
claim against the police chief, the court held the chief's actions to lie
within the scope of his "discretionary authority."'
Additionally,
plaintiff failed to show that it was "obvious to all reasonable government
actors, in [the chief's] place, that 'what he was doing' violated federal

145. Id. at 630, 497 S.E.2d at 373. Plaintiff alleged "that the street and the creek were
negligently constructed and maintained by the City or constituted a nuisance." Id.
146. A friend of the deceased child testified that they had discussed the drop-off and
the fact that they could be hurt by falling into the creek. Id. at 631, 497 S.E.2d at 374.
147. 230 Ga. App. at 633, 497 S.E.2d at 375 (quoting Abee v. Stone Mountain Mem'l
Ass'n, 252 Ga. 465, 465-66, 314 S.E.2d 444, 445 (1984)).
148. The "constitutional tort" derives from the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1994), providing a civil action for government violations of constitutional
protections. For treatment of this statute by both federal and state courts in respect to
Georgia local governments, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LAW'S ASSIMILATION OF Monell: SECTION 1983 AND THE NEW "PERSONS" (1984). For an
exclusive focus upon the statute in the Georgia appellate courts, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr.,
Local Government and Constitutional Torts: In the Georgia Courts, 49 MERCER L. REV. 1
(1997).
149. 226 Ga. App. 705, 487 S.E.2d 478 (1997).
150. Id. at 705, 487 S.E.2d at 480. Plaintiff had been arrested and charged with drug
trafficking, and the police chief immediately terminated his employment. Id. at 705-06,
487 S.E.2d at 480-81. Said the court: "42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action to an
individual who has been deprived of a property right by a government official without due
process." Id. at 707, 487 S.E.2d at 481.
151. Id. at 709, 487 S.E.2d at 483.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 708, 487 S.E.2d at 482. "[A] defendant public official asserting immunity
must show that 'he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the
allegedly wrongful acts occurred."' Id. (quoting Stough v. Gallagher, 967 F.2d 1523, 1526
(lth Cir. 1992)).
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Accordingly, the chief enjoyed "qualified immunity" from

"155
liability for the "constitutional tort.

J.

Zoning

On occasion, a municipality's reaction to a judicial zoning order can
bear striking consequences. In City of Cumming v. Realty Development
Corp.,56 the trial judge ordered the municipal reconsideration of an
application for rezoning to "multi-family residential."5 7 The municipality responded by rezoning the property to "industrial use."5 8
Affirming a finding of wilful contempt, the supreme court observed as
follows: "The evidence ... supported the trial court's finding that
appellants made no effort to reconsider the rezoning application or to
consider, in the rezoning process, the findings and conclusions the trial
court made in its first order."'5 9 The court likewise rejected the city's
protest to the requirement of a public hearing. 6 ° "When... the court
finds the first zoning decision unconstitutional and remands the matter
to the local government, the process is, in essence, begun anew." 6' In

154. Id.
Considering the availability of ... pre- and post-termination remedies, and
[plaintiffs] failure to present authority showing these remedies deprived him of
due process, we cannot say that it must have been obvious to all reasonable
government actors in [the chiefs] place that terminating [plaintiff] under the
above procedures violated federal law.
Id. at 709, 487 S.E.2d at 483.
155. Id. However, the court did reverse the trial judge's summary judgment for the
police chief on plaintiffs charge of deprivation of a liberty interest via defamation. Id. at
710, 487 S.E.2d at 483. The chief had made no claim of qualified immunity to this claim
in the trial court. Id. at 711, 487 S.E.2d at 484. As to the state law of defamation in
respect to Georgia local government, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Defamation in GeorgiaLocal
Government Law: A Brief History, 16 GA. L. REV. 627 (1982).
156. 268 Ga. 461, 491 S.E.2d 60 (1997).
157. The trial court found the existing zoning ('Highway Business") unconstitutional
and directed the municipality to reconsider the rezoning petition taking into account the
findings made in the court's order. Id. at 461, 491 S.E.2d at 62.
158. Id. The municipality gave "notice that a vote on rezoning would be held at a
specially called meeting, but that there would be no hearing conducted at the meeting."
Id.
159. Id. at 462, 491 S.E.2d at 62. The court also affirmed the imposed sanction of two
hundred dollars per day until municipal compliance with the order but reversed the award
of attorney fees. "The award of attorney fees based on no more than being held in
contempt, however, does nothing to encourage appellants to comply with the court's order
and, therefore, is punitive." Id., 491 S.E.2d at 63.
160. Id. at 463, 491 S.E.2d at 63.
161. Id.
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that circumstance, the court held, the Zoning Procedures Law requires
another hearing." 2
A second rezoning controversy, City of McDonough v. Tusk Partners,6 ' featured a trial court's invalidation of the subject property's
The supreme court's affirmance aptly evidenced
current zoning."
both the standard of review and the substantive law."6 5 First,
Where a property owner adduces evidence that establishes a down turn
in viability of a property under its current zoning and a decrease in
land value if the property remains under its current zoning classification, a trial court does not clearly err by concluding the property owner
has carried its burden of proving a significant detriment. i6
Second, "Where the evidence conflicts as to the impact of the use on the
public health and welfare, the trial court does not clearly err by
concluding the property owner has carried its burden of proving the
zoning is unsubstantially related to the public health, safety and
welfare."' 67
II.

COUNTIES

Officers and Employees
Intragovernmental conflict accounted for most of the litigation
surrounding county officers and employees. The conflict of In re Floyd
County Grand Jury Presentments'68 arose from a county grand jury's
report extremely critical of the Georgia attorney general's investigation
Upon the attorney general's
of the county hospital authority.'
petition to expunge the report, the court of appeals held the grand jury's
A.

162. Id. at 463-64, 491 S.E.2d at 63. "The Zoning Procedures Law, OCGA § 36-66-4(a),
states plainly that '[a] local zoning authority taking action resulting in a zoning decision
shall provide for a hearing on the proposed action.'" Id. at 463, 491 S.E.2d at 63.
163. 268 Ga. 693, 492 S.E.2d 206 (1997).
164. Id. at 695, 492 S.E.2d at 208. Plaintiff sought a commercial classification but
defendants zoned the property residential. Id. at 694, 492 S.E.2d at 207.
165. Le., the standard of "clearly erroneous" and the substantive tests of whether the
present zoning is "significantly detrimental" to the owner and "unsubstantially related" to
pubic welfare.
166. 268 Ga. at 696, 492 S.E.2d at 208.
167. Id., 492 S.E.2d at 209. The court agreed that the evidence would also have
authorized an opposite conclusion but emphasized that it would not reweigh the evidence
on appeal. Id.
168. 225 Ga. App. 705, 484 S.E.2d 769 (1997).
169. Id. at 705, 484 S.E.2d at 770. "The presentment contained allegations which not
only were critical of the Attorney General, but also cast reflections of misconduct and
impugned the character of the Attorney General and his office." Id.
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presentment powers statutorily limited to true bills of indictment
charging specific offenses. 7 ° There is no power to cast "reflections of
misconduct" or impugn "the character of a local office holder."'71 This
principle applies all the more forcefully to the attorney general, a state
constitutional officer.'17723 Reversing the trial judge, the court ordered
the report expunged.
A more localized conflict erupted in Purvis v. Ballantine,'74 a former
county school superintendent's defamation action for statements by his
successor.'7 5 Classifying the superintendent as a "public official,"'76
the court reasoned that he "was an integral policy maker," he was
"involved in the conduct of [the school] system," and he had "greater
access to the media than would a private individual."'77 As such,
plaintiff had failed to make his case-he had "failed to point to any
evidence of actual malice giving rise to a triable issue."'

170. Id. at 707, 484 S.E.2d at 771. This was true, the court observed, even under the
grand jury's recently broadened powers in O.C.G.A. section 15-12-71(b)(1) and (2). Id.
171. 225 Ga. App. at 707, 484 S.E.2d at 771.
172. "Under no legal fiction does the expanded powers of OCGA § 15-12-71(b) allow a
grand jury to civilly investigate a state official or agency." Id. at 708, 484 S.E.2d at 771.
"Thus, the grand jury cannot do indirectly what it is prohibited from doing directly: poke
the Attorney General for the State of Georgia in the eye and then claim that it was merely
incidental to a legitimate exercise of civil investigative powers and presentments regarding
county authorities." Id.
173. Id. Moreover, the court held that the trial judge "erred in holding that the
Attorney General or a member of his staff was not a state agent but, in fact, a district
attorney pro tempore." Id. at 709, 484 S.E.2d at 772. Finally, the court noted that public
officers facing indictment in Georgia are entitled to "the right to appear before a grand jury
with counsel, to give sworn testimony without cross examination, and to view but not crossexamine witnesses appearing against them." Id. For perspective on this point, see R.
Perry Sentell, Jr., GeorgiaLocal Government Officials and the GrandJury, 26 GA. ST. B.J.
50 (1989).
174. 226 Ga. App. 246, 487 S.E.2d 14 (1997).
175. Plaintiff sued the successor superintendent and members of the county board of
education, alleging they made statements falsely implying that his administration had
failed to make payments to the Teacher's Retirement System. Id. at 248, 487 S.E.2d at 17.
176. Id. at 249, 487 S.E.2d at 18. The court noted the necessity of this test under New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). For treatment of this issue in Georgia, see
R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Defamation in Georgia Local Government Law: A Brief History, 16
GA. L. REV. 627 (1982).
177. 226 Ga. App. at 249, 487 S.E.2d at 18 (citing Ellerbee v. Mills, 262 Ga. 516, 422
S.E.2d 539 (1992)).
178. Id. at 251, 487 S.E.2d at 18. The court held that defendants' "refusal to retract
their statements [was not] clear and convincing evidence that the statements themselves
were made with knowledge of their falsity or reckless disregard for their falsity." Id., 487
S.E.2d at 19. The court thus affirmed the trial judge's summary judgment for defendants.
Id.
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On several occasions, the county governing authority was at odds with
other county officials regarding personnel powers. Glynn County v.
Waters 79 featured a standoff between the governing authority and the
county administrator over the power to terminate a department
head. 8 ' In resolving the conflict, the supreme court relied upon a
county ordinance providing that the employee "shall be hired and
terminated by the county administrator, subject to approval by the
county commission."'' Under that ordinance, the court held, the
governing authority could only approve or disapprove the administrator's
employment decision;8 2 "it was without authority to initiate its own
effort to discharge [the employee]."'
The court reached a similar conclusion in Chambers v. Fulford's in
respect to a county tax appraiser. Under general statutes, the court held
the county board of tax assessors was required to employ a tax appraiser
subject to the approval of the county commissioners. 88
Having
approved a contract of employment, the commissioners could not
subsequently refuse to fund the position.'8 8 The power to hire and fire
the tax appraiser rests with the board of tax assessors, the court held,
"not with the board of commissioners, which previously approved the
contract."'87

179. 268 Ga. 500, 491 S.E.2d 370 (1997).
180. Id. at 500, 491 S.E.2d at 371. The department head was charged with creating
a hostile work environment. The county administrator offered the employee reassignment
to another position. The county governing authority discharged the employee. Id.
181. Id. at 500-01, 491 S.E.2d at 371.
182. Id. at 502, 491 S.E.2d at 372. "Since the county commission has neither express
nor implied authority to hire and discharge [the employee], the trial court correctly
construed the county ordinance as vesting the exclusive power to do so in the county
administrator." Id.
183. Id. The court held the governing authority's actions to be ministerial in nature
and thus affirmed the trial judge's grant of equitable relief against the authority. Id. at
503, 491 S.E.2d at 372-73.
184. 268 Ga. 892, 495 S.E.2d 6 (1998).
185. Id. at 894, 495 S.E.2d at 9. The court relied upon O.C.G.A. section 48-5-262. The
appraiser's rate of compensation is determined by the state revenue commissioner and
payable from county funds. Id. at 893, 495 S.E.2d at 8.
186. The commissioners had approved the board of tax assessors' four-year contract
with the appraiser, but the next year a successor board of commissioners refused to
appropriate funds sufficient to honor the contract. Id. at 892, 495 S.E.2d at 7.
187. Id. at 894, 495 S.E.2d at 8. Because the commissioners were liable on the contract
and because the assessors had no other legal remedy to honor it, the court affirmed the
trial court's issuance of a mandamus against the commissioners. Id. at 893, 495 S.E.2d at
8. On the inordinate amount of litigation over mandamus in local government law and the
necessary prerequisites for its issuance, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., MISCASTING
MANDAMUS N GEORGIA LocAL GOVERNMENT LAW (1989).
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Contrarily, under a local statute approved as valid in Hussey v.
Chatham County,' the commissioners were empowered to remove
members of the board of tax assessors. 8 ' Upholding the statute's
repeal of earlier legislation authorizing the board's creation, 9 ° the
court rejected arguments of due process. "'[T]he right of an incumbent
to an office depends upon the law under which he holds. If the law is
capable of being repealed, the right of the officer is gone.'"'9'
There were also controversies over workers' compensation benefits for
county employees. In Housing Authority of Cartersville v. Jackson,192
the court of appeals considered the status of an appointed member of the
housing authority whom agreed to serve, without pay, as the authority's
acting executive director. 9 Affirming workers' compensation coverage
for injuries,' 94 the court reasoned as follows: "Because the Authority's
Board of Commissioners had the power to control and discharge [the
director], and his services were of significant economic value to the
Authority, the superior court did not err in upholding the State Board's
finding that he was an employee."' 95

In yet another survey period case, Lee v. Peach County Boardof Commissioners, 269 Ga.
380, 497 S.E.2d 562 (1998), the court mandamused the county commissioners to pay the
county chief magistrate the salary he was receiving at the time of his appointment. Id. at
382, 497 S.E.2d at 563. Having assumed the unexpired term of office of chief magistrate
at a given salary, the court held, the plaintiffs salary could not later be reduced by the
commissioners. Id. at 381-82, 497 S.E.2d at 563. "The Board violated both the
constitutional [art. VI, § VII, s V] and statutory [O.C.G.A. § 15-10-23(a)] mandates in
reducing [plaintiffs] salary during the unexpired term which he was serving." Id.
188. 268 Ga. 871, 494 S.E.2d 510 (1998).
189. Id. at 871, 494 S.E.2d at 511. 1994 Ga. Laws 3940. The statute authorized the
county commissioners to appoint a board of tax assessors. Under this statute, the
commissioners removed the members of the joint city-county board of tax assessors. For
an earlier installment in the litigation, see Chatham County v. Hussey, 267 Ga. 895, 485
S.E.2d 753 (1997), holding that the 1994 statute's predecessor had not been repealed by
implication.
190. The court held that the statute's title was not insufficient under the constitution's
requirement (Art. III, § V, III) that statutory titles relate to the object of the statute. 268
Ga. 871, 871, 494 S.E.2d 510, 511 (1998).
191. 268 Ga. at 872, 494 S.E.2d at 512 (quoting City of Mountain View v. Clayton
County, 242 Ga. 163, 168, 249 S.E.2d 541, 544 (1978)).
192. 226 Ga. App. 182, 486 S.E.2d 54 (1997).
193. Id. at 182, 486 S.E.2d at 55. Although the position was a full-time one and carried
a substantial salary, the claimant agreed to serve in the temporary position of acting
director without compensation. Id.
194. Claimant was injured in a traffic accident while driving an authority-owned car
on authority business. Id. at 183, 486 S.E.2d at 56.
195. Id. at 184-85, 486 S.E.2d at 57. The court reviewed the statutory definition of
"employee" in O.C.G.A. section 34-9-1(2) and said that the main test is whether the worker
is subject to control and discharge by the master. Id. at 183, 486 S.E.2d at 56. "We do not
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Finally, Bartow County Board of Education v. Ray.'96 featured a
county's intervention in its employee's action against a third-party
tortfeasor, claiming reimbursement for workers compensation benefits
paid to the employee.' 97 The court immediately seized upon the
subrogation statute's prerequisite that the third-party action has "fully
and completely compensated" the employee.' 98 The county failed to
establish that prerequisite, the court held, upon the following showing:
(1) it had paid the employee $39,000 in benefits, (2) the employee sought
$900,000 in damages from the third party but only demonstrated special
damages of $54,000, and (3) the jury returned a general verdict of
$175,000.'99 From these facts, it was impossible to know "what portion
of the award applied to economic losses and what portion applied to
noneconomic losses." °° Although not statutorily required, the court
reflected, a special verdict
"would have given ...
20
impossible to ascertain."M

the answer it is now

B. Regulation
A general statute requires county approval for the construction of a
landfill that, though located in another jurisdiction, will be within one-

hold that compensation, or the lack of it, is irrelevant to the issue of whether one is an
employee under the Act. We merely hold it is not controlling." Id. at 184, 486 S.E.2d at
56.
196. 229 Ga. App. 333, 494 S.E.2d 29 (1997).
197. Id. at 333, 494 S.E.2d at 30. A county school bus driver was injured in a collision
with a third party. The county paid the driver workers' compensation benefits and then
intervened in the driver's tort action against the third-party. Id.
198. Id. at 334, 494 S.E.2d at 30. O.C.G.A. section 34-9-11.1(b) (1998) states:
[T]he employer's or insurer's recovery under this Code section shall be limited to
the recovery of the amount of disability benefits, death benefits, and medical
expenses paid under this chapter and shall only be recoverable if the injured
employee has been fully and completely compensated, taking into consideration
both the benefits received under this chapter and the amount of the recovery in
the third-party claim, for all economic and noneconomic losses incurred as a result
of the injury.
199. 229 Ga. App. at 334, 494 S.E.2d at 30. The court said that "the statute prescribes
no method by which an employer can establish that a workers' compensation recipient has
been fully and completely compensated by a recovery from a third-party tortfeasor." Id.
at 334, 494 S.E.2d at 30.
200. Id. at 335, 494 S.E.2d at 31. The court reasoned that if the jury had intended
most of the award to compensate for pain and suffering, this "would not leave [the
employee] fully and completely compensated for her economic losses." Id.
201. Id. The court thus affirmed the trial judge's denial of the county's subrogation
lien. Id.
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half mile of the county's border. 2 In Long v. FSL'Corp.,203 plaintiff
sought to mandamus the county's approval of such a landfill. °4
Rejecting plaintiff's efforts, the supreme court viewed the requirement
as a part of the "statutory scheme requiring a permit from the State for
a land use which is regulated by the State."20 5 Although the statute
places no limits on the county's decision-making process, the state
retains authority to grant the permit under specified conditions.0 6
"Since a jurisdiction can withhold permission for any reason, there can
be no clear legal right to have permission given, and the statute provides
another remedy which has not been ruled inadequate."2 7 Accordingly,
neither condition for obtaining a mandamus was present.0 8
A county's challenged prohibition on alcohol at adult entertainment
establishments brought Chambers v. Peach County"9 before the
supreme court. The court held that the county had relied upon evidence
reasonably believed to show that such establishments decreased
residential property values and increased crime.210 As a contentneutral measure, 211 the ordinance furthered important governmental
interests unrelated to suppressing speech and incidentally restricted

202. O.C.G.A. § 12-8-25(3) (1996 & Supp. 1998). This statute was amended in 1997 so
as to afford municipalities the same power of approval.
203. 268 Ga. 479, 490 S.E.2d 102 (1997).
204. Id. at 479, 490 S.E.2d at 102. Plaintiff sought a permit to build the landfill from
the Department of Natural Resources only to be informed that it must obtain the county's
approval. Plaintiff then sought the county's approval and shortly thereafter filed this
action in mandamus. Id. at 480, 490 S.E.2d at 102.
205. Id., 490 S.E.2d at 103. "Since this is not a zoning case, it is to be considered an
appeal from the grant of a writ of mandamus, which is a direct appeal." Id.
206. The state can grant the permit "if the applicant provides evidence that no
alternative sites or methods are available in that jurisdiction or in any adjoining
jurisdiction of the affected city or county for the handling of its solid waste." O.C.G.A. § 128-25(a)(3) (Supp. 1998).
207. 268 Ga. at 481, 490 S.E.2d at 103.
208. The court thus reversed the trial judge's issuance of the mandamus. For
discussion of the general issue, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., MISCASTING MANDAMUS IN
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAw (1989).

209. 268 Ga. 672, 492 S.E.2d 191 (1997).
210. Id. at 673-74, 492 S.E.2d at 192. This evidence consisted of testimony regarding
other cities' experiences, as well as testimony by law enforcement officers relating to
greatly increased criminal activities at plaintiffs establishment. Id. at 674, 492 S.E.2d at
192.
211. "Since the new ordinance is designed to combat the undesirable secondary effects
of sexually explicit businesses, it is content-neutral .

. . ."

Id.
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speech no greater than necessary.212 Consequently, the court affirmed
denial of an interlocutory injunction.2 13
C.

Contracts

An effort to sue the county in contract fared poorly in Merk v. DeKalb
County,214 an action fod
for damages caused when defective sewer lines
flooded plaintiff's home. 215 The court of appeals resolutely rejected
plaintiff's attempt to prove a contract from county code provisions
regarding water service. 216 The county code does not constitute a
contract as contemplated by the constitution for purposes of waiving
sovereign immunity.2 17 Neither was the code a contract "written and

212. Id., 492 S.E.2d at 192-93 (citing Paramount Pictures v. Busbee, 250 Ga. 252, 297
S.E.2d 250 (1982)).
213. Id. at 675, 492 S.E.2d at 193. The court rejected arguments that the ordinance
could not be applied to a club operating prior to its adoption and that the ordinance was
unconstitutionally overbroad, thus affording county officials unbridled discretion. Id. at
674, 492 S.E.2d at 193. In the event of overbroadness, said the court, the ordinance's
severability clause would save its valid parts. Id. at 674-75, 492 S.E.2d at 193. For
background on the issue of county regulation, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Discretion in
GeorgiaLocal Government Law, 8 GA. L. REV. 614 (1974); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Reasoning
by Riddle: The Power to Prohibit in Georgia Local Government Law, 9 GA. L. REV. 115
(1974); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government Law and Liquor Licensing: A Sobering
Vignette, 15 GA. L. REV. 1039 (1981); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., "AscertainableStandards"vs.
"UnbridledDiscretion" in Georgia Local Government Law, GA. COUNTY GOv. MA. (Dec.
1989).
214. 226 Ga. App. 191, 486 S.E.2d 66 (1997).
215. Id. at 191, 486 S.E.2d at 67. Plaintiff was a county citizen receiving water and
sewer services from the county. Id.
216. Id. at 192, 486 S.E.2d at 67. Plaintiff alleged that the county code "constitutes a
written contract for sewer service between her[self] and the county." Id. The court was
skeptical of plaintiffs cite of a code provision dealing with water services: "While [plaintiff]
acknowledges that this language pertains to water and not sewer service, she maintains
that it creates an enforceable written contract for sewer service." Id.
217. GA. CONST. art. I, § II, para. IX. "[Plaintiffs] claim, though couched in contract,
actually sounds in tort. We have held that when a plaintiff's action sounds in tort and not
contract, even though the action is brought as a contractual one, no constitutional waiver
of sovereign immunity results." 226 Ga. App. at 192, 486 S.E.2d at 67.
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218
entered" on the county minutes as required by statute.
The court
21
county.
thus affirmed summary judgement for the
In tension with its treatment of Merk, the court of appeals also decided
Cherokee County v. Hause.22 ° There, a wrecker service sought to
recover vehicle storage fees from the county.221 The court approached
the case by expressly excluding theories of quantum meruit 222 and
restitution.223 Likewise, "[t]here is in the record no contract in writing
between the county and [plaintiffs] entered on the minutes of the county
commission."224 Accordingly, "a contract is unenforceable."2 25 However, the court delineated, the claim rested not upon contract but on a
county ordinance providing for wrecker and storage services.225
Plaintiffs who supplied those services "are entitled to be paid the fees
expressly provided by that same ordinance."227 It was left to a dissent-

218.
Taking the sections of the ... County Code on water and sewer together, as
[plaintiff] would have us do, it is clear that the Code does not contain all the
necessary terms of a contract .... The evidence is also uncontroverted that no
contract naming [plaintiff] appears on the minutes of the . . . County Board of
Commissioners as required by OCGA § 36-10-1.
Id. at 193, 486 S.E.2d at 68. For treatment of this statute and its history in the Georgia
courts, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., County Contracts in Georgia: "Written and Entered," 32
MERCER L. REV. 283 (1980).
219. 226 Ga. App. at 193, 486 S.E.2d at 68.
220. 229 Ga. App. 578, 494 S.E.2d 234 (1997).
221. Id. at 578, 494 S.E.2d at 234. The facts were undisputed that plaintiffs provided
the storage requested by the county sheriff and submitted a bill but "were informed that
the county budget could not accommodate the bill, and it was not paid, unlike all the others
submitted and paid during the course of 35 years during which plaintiffs provided 24-hour
wrecker service to [the] County." Id. at 579, 494 S.E.2d at 235.
222. "Plaintiffs did not seek recovery on a theory of quantum meruit as an alternative,
as well they could not, for quantum meruit 'is not available when a county is the
defendant.'" Id. (quoting PMS Constr. Co. v. DeKalb County, 243 Ga. 870, 872, 257 S.E.2d
285, 287 (1979)).
223. "Restitution is available as a remedy against a county .... but plaintiffs did not
seek that here." Id. at 579, 494 S.E.2d at 235.
224. Id. at 580, 494 S.E.2d at 236.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 580-81, 494 S.E.2d at 236. "Thus, the action is based not 'on contract' but
on a 'right to [fees] as fixed by or in pursuance of law,'" Id. (quoting Graham v. Beacham,

189 Ga. 304, 306, 5 S.E.2d 775, 776 (1939)).
227. Id. at 581, 494 S.E.2d at 236. "Had [plaintiffs] refused the assignment and not
performed the services required by the sheriff, they would have been in violation of Section
3-25-30 of the ordinance." Id. The court thus affirmed the trial judge in finding for the
plaintiffs, also agreeing with the judge that the recovery must be limited to one year's
worth of storage fees "due to the restriction contained in OCGA § 36-11-1." Id. at 578, 494
S.E.2d at 234. This statute mandates that claims against counties must be presented
within twelve months. For a history of that mandate, and an analysis of the court
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ing opinion to emphasize that an ordinance authorizing contracts with
approved wrecker services "is not itself a sufficient writing entered upon
22s
the minutes of the county commission."
The court's approach turned considerably more restrictive in Wasilkoff
v. Douglas County,229 a case litigating a multi-year lease purchase
agreement "from which [the county] could be released only if it did not
have sufficient funds to appropriate for the required payments."2 °
Emphasizing the "strictly limited" statutory exception2 31 to constitutional "debt" prohibitions,232 the court held the agreement insufficient.233 By conditioning the' county's release upon lack of sufficient
funds, the contract failed the statutory mandate that the agreement
"must terminate absolutely and without further obligation on the part
of the [county] at the close of each calendar year."2 4 The court thus
declared the contract "void as a matter of law" 23' and denied the
26
lessor's recovery under it.
Finally, in Chambers v. Fulford,237 county commissioners attacked
the validity of a four-year contract between the board of tax assessors
and a tax appraiser-a contract approved by former commissioners.23
The successor commissioners charged that the contract violated the
statute prohibiting governing authorities from binding themselves or
their successors in governmental matters.239 Summarily rejecting the

decisions under it, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Claims Against Counties: The Difference a
Year Makes, 36 MERCER L. REV. 1 (1984).
228. 229 Ga. App. at 583, 494 S.E.2d at 238 (McMurray, P.J., dissenting).
229. 227 Ga. App. 232, 488 S.E.2d 722 (1997).
230. Id. at 234, 488 S.E.2d at 724. The county entered the lease purchase agreement
for a computer system in 1989, refused to make payments for the fiscal year 1993, and was
sued under the contract by the assignee. Id. at 232-33, 488 S.E.2d at 723.
231. O.C.G.A. § 36-60-13 (1993 & Supp. 1998). The statute excepts authorized lease
purchase contracts from the voter approval requirement for new county debt imposed by
the constitution.
232. GA. CONST. art. IX, §.V, para. I(a).
233. 227 Ga. App. at 234, 488 S.E.2d at 724.
234. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 36-60-13(a)(1) (1993 & Supp. 1998)).
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. 268 Ga. 892, 495 S.E.2d 6 (1998).
238. This case is previously discussed as holding that the county commissioners were
without power to terminate the tax appraiser when statutory law vested that authority in
the board of tax assessors. See text accompanying supra notes 185-87.
239. 268 Ga. at 892, 495 S.E.2d at 7. O.C.G.A. § 36-30-3(a) (1993 & Supp. 1998). For
extensive background on this statutory prohibition, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local
Government and Contracts That Bind, 3 GA. L. REV. 546 (1969); R. Perry Sentell, Jr.,
Binding Contracts in Local Government Law: Recent Perspectives, 11 GA. ST. B.J. 148
(1975); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Binding Contracts in Georgia Local Government Law:
Configurations of Codification, 24 GA. L. REV. 95 (1989); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Binding
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charge, the supreme court held the binding-contracts prohibition "plainly
not applicable."24 ° The issue, reasoned the court, "is not legislation
promulgated by the former board of commissioners but an act of the
Georgia Legislature expressly requiring the county, through the board
of tax assessors, to provide for an appraiser under its comprehensive
uniform codification of real property taxation."2 4'
D.

Roads

In McDilda v. Board of Commissioners of Bulloch County,242 two
counties sought to enjoin defendant from blocking a road.243 For two
reasons, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's finding that the
road was a public one.244 First, the court held that the road did not
cease to be public because the counties failed to maintain it.2 4 "The
county would not be authorized to abandon the road because of disuse
when that disuse was occasioned by the county's failure to comply with
its duty to maintain and repair it." 246 Second, a resolution to close the
road, executed by the chairman of one county's board of commissioners,
was ineffective.247 The commission had not delegated its power of

Contracts in County Government-Never Mind, GA. COUNTY GOV. MAG. 28 (Mar. 1991).
240. 268 Ga. at 894, 495 S.E.2d at 8.
241. Id. "We cannot read OCGA § 36-30-3 as creating a rule that a county board of tax
assessors may not enter into a contract of reasonable duration which extends beyond the
term of that board of commissioners which had the initial approval power over the
contract." Id., 495 S.E.2d at 8-9.
Yet another case of the period, Providence Construction Co. v. Bauer, 229 Ga. App. 679,
494 S.E.2d 527 (1997), involved not a county contract, but rather deed covenants under
which subdivision residents agreed not to oppose the subdivision developer's subsequent
efforts to rezone property for certain purposes. When the developer sued the residents on
these covenants for publicly opposing its efforts to obtain county rezoning, the court viewed
this as "its first opportunity to apply the provisions of OCGA § 9-11-11.1 . . . sometimes
referred to as an 'anti-SLAPP' statute." Id. at 679, 494 S.E.2d at 528. The court proceeded
to hold the covenants "overly broad" and "vague" and "contrary to public policy and the
public interest." Id. at 681-82, 494 S.E.2d at 530.
242. 230 Ga. App. 530, 497 S.E.2d 25 (1998).
243. Id. at 530, 497 S.E.2d at 26. Defendant contended that the portion of the road
crossing his property is private property, that the counties had abandoned the road, and
that neither county possessed the power to reopen the road. Id. at 530-31, 497 S.E.2d at
26.
244. Id. at 534-35, 497 S.E.2d at 29.
245. Id. at 531, 497 S.E.2d at 27. "It is therefore clear from the record that the road
did not become private property because it was impassable and was abandoned by virtue
of the two counties' failure to maintain it." Id.
246. Id.
247. The court held that neither county had ever followed the statutory procedures
necessary for closing the road. Id. at 531-32, 497 S.E.2d at 27-28; O.C.G.A. § 32-7-2(b)(1).
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abandonment to the chairman,245 and "[t]he citizens of [the county]
cannot be estopped . . . by the action of
the Commission Chairman in
249
executing an unauthorized resolution."

E. Taxation
In Cellular One, Inc. v. Emanuel County, 20 "a case of first impression in this state,"251 the court of appeals held a county devoid of
power to sue dealers for failing to properly remit local option sales taxes
to the State Revenue Commissioner. 2
Considering the comprehensive administrative scheme provided by the
Georgia statutes and the Department of Revenue's rules and regulations, which include remedies for the failure to properly remit the taxes
and an administrative forum for the resolution of controversies
concerning the taxes, we conclude that the legislature did not intend
for counties to have an independent right of action against dealers for
damages resulting from the improper remittance of local sales taxes
administered and collected by the commissioner.253

F

Liability

County liability litigation maintained a frantic pace during the survey
255 plaintiff sought
period.254 In Cleveland v. Skandalakis,
to manda-

248. The court held that under O.C.G.A. section 36-5-22.1(a)(3) "the commission as a
body has the authority to decide matters" of abolishing roads and that "no local law had
been enacted delegating this authority to the Commission Chairman acting alone." 230 Ga.
App. at 533, 497 S.E.2d at 28. For treatment of the assorted issues arising under
delegation of power in local government law, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Delegation in
Georgia Local Government Law, 7 GA. ST. B.J. 9 (1970).
249. 230 Ga. App. at 533, 497 S.E.2d at 28 (citing O.C.G.A. § 45-6-5 (1990)). For
extensive treatment of estoppel issues in the law of local government, see R. PERRY
SENTELL, JR., THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL IN GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAw (1985).
250. 227 Ga. App. 197, 489 S.E.2d 50 (1997).
251. Id. at 199, 489 S.E.2d at 52.
252. Id. The county alleged improper collection and remittance of the taxes on the part
of the dealers and its consequent receipt of inadequate revenues and sought both to collect
the reduced revenues and to recover damages directly from the dealers. Id. at 197, 489
S.E.2d at 51.
253. Id. at 200, 489 S.E.2d at 53. The court reviewed various provisions of the relevant
statute, O.C.G.A. sections 48-8-30 to -113, concluded the statute to provide the exclusive
means of administration and collection, and opposed a view that "would allow tax
beneficiaries ... to sue any taxpayer or dealers for failing to properly remit a tax; a
situation which we believe would severely frustrate the orderly administration and
collection of taxes by the commissioner." Id. The court thus reversed the trial .judge's
denial of defendants' motions to dismiss. Id.
254. For perspective, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., GeorgiaLocal Government TortLiability:
The "Crisis"Conundrum, 2 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 19 (1985); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local
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mus county payment of a default judgment against a former county
employee.25 At the time of the original action, the county assigned an
attorney to represent the employee. That action was dismissed without
prejudice and later refiled at a time when the individual no longer
worked for the county. This time, the former employee requested no
county attorney and suffered the default judgment. 257 The supreme
court held the refiled action was one de novo,255 carrying no continuing
county obligation. Because the former employee failed to make a timely
request under the county code,259 the county owed no duty to defend
him or to pay the judgment against him.26 °
Obligation likewise proved pivotal in Macon-Bibb County Hospital
Authority v. Reece,26 ' an action seeking reimbursement for medical care
provided by the hospital to county "detainees." Under the material
statute, the county's reimbursement duty depended upon whether the
detainees were "inmates" in the sheriff's "physical custody."262 Concluding that under the circumstances26 3 a jury might reasonably find
either way on both issues,2" the court of appeals voided the trial
judge's summary judgment.265

Government Tort Liability: The Summer of '92, 9 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 405 (1993).
255. 268 Ga. 133, 485 S.E.2d 777 (1997).
256. Plaintiff was the administrator of the estate of one who sued the county employee
for wrongful death. Id. at 133, 485 S.E.2d at 778.
257. Id., 485 S.E.2d at 778-79. "The undisputed facts show that [the former employee]
failed to comply with the 'timely written request' requirements of [the] County Code § 24-44(b) after he was served with the complaint.. . ." Id. at 134, 485 S.E.2d at 779.
258. 'A renewal suit filed under OCGA § 9-2-61 is an action de novo." Id.
259. "Timely written notice was required in order to obligate the county to defend the
lawsuit, and without a request for defense ... no such obligation arose." Id.
260. Id. "Accordingly, plaintiff is not entitled to the extraordinary writ of mandamus."
Id. at 135, 485 S.E.2d at 780.
261. 228 Ga. App. 532, 492 S.E.2d 292 (1997).
262. Id. at 532, 492 S.E.2d at 293 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 42-5-2(a) (1997)).
263. The detainees had been shot by a deputy sheriff when stopped as suspects in a
robbery. They were handcuffed and transported to the hospital, where the deputy
remained while they were treated. They were then arrested several days after their
release. Id. at 533, 492 S.E.2d at 293-94.
264. As to "physical custody," the deputy had placed the suspects under arrest when
he stopped them and he remained with them throughout their treatment. On the other
hand, the deputy released the suspects to the hospital, and they were not arrested until
several days after their release. Id. at 534-35, 492 S.E.2d at 294. As to their "inmate"
status, although the suspects were not imprisoned, but for their injuries, they would have
been detained in the county detention facility. Id. at 535, 492 S.E.2d at 295.
265. Id. at 536, 492 S.E.2d at 296.
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Several claimants raised the prospect of immunity waiver by statutory

authorization of insurance.2 66 Plaintiff prevailed on the issue in Coffee
County School District v. King,2 7 a claim for injuries sustained in a
collision with defendant's school bus.26 Given the'undisputed presence of liability insurance, 269 the court relied upon the statute expressly waiving county immunity for insured motor Vehicles.
That
waiver, the court held, justified denial of the school district's motion for
summary judgment.2 71
:
The motor vehicle insurance statute also controlled Simmons v.
Coweta County,272 a county inmate's suit for injury 'when struck by a
piece of metal while operating a bush hog.273 Under a "commercial
general insurance policy,"2 74 the court held that the bush hog was a
covered vehicle275 being operated by county employees and in-

266. For perspective, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Tort LiabilityInsurancein GeorgiaLocal
Government Law, 24 MERCER L. REV. 651 (1973).
267. 229 Ga. App. 143, 493 S.E.2d 563 (1997).
268. Plaintiff alleged negligence on the part of the school district's bus driver. Id. at
143, 493 S.E.2d at 564.
269. "OCGA § 20-2-1092 provides that.., the school boards are authorized to insure
the general public against injury resulting from the negligent operation of school buses."
229 Ga. App. at 144, 493 S.E.2d at 565.
270. Id., 493 S.E.2d at 564. O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51 (1996).
271. 229 Ga. App. at 145, 493 S.E.2d at 565. "The critical factin this case is that a
vehicular accident was involved and the waiver of sovereign immunity under OCGA § 3324-51 is dispositive." Id.
In another case of the period, Payne v. Twiggs County School District, 269 Ga. 361, 496
S.E.2d 690 (1998), the supreme court focused upon a statute requiring school boards to
obtain insurance protecting school children riding on buses against "bodily injury or death
at any time resulting from an accident or collision in which such buses are involved. ...
."
Id. at 362, 496 S.E.2d at 691 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 20-2-1090 (1996)).!, Under a school board
policy obtained pursuant to this statute, the court held, there could be no direct action
against the insurance company by a student physically attacked by: another student while
on the bus. Id. at 363, 496 S.E.2d at 692. "The school bus is onlytangentially connected
to [plaintiffs] injuries, and even then only to the extent that it was the situs of the attack."
Id. Neither, the court held, could plaintiff sue as a third-party benefi ciary of the insurance
contract between the school district and the insurer. Id. at 364,,496 S.E.2d at 692.
272. 229 Ga. App. 550, 494 S.E.2d 362 (1997).
273. Id. at 550-51, 494 S.E.2d at 365. Plaintiff was assigned .e job of operating the
bush hog; other inmates, under supervision of a correctional officer, were assigned to
remove debris from the cutting path. Plaintiff was injured when thee:blade of the bush hog
struck a coil of barbed wire and propelled a piece into his head. Id: at 551, 494 S.E.2d at
362.
274. Id. at 553, 494 S.E.2d at 367.
275. The policy "provided insurance coverage for operation of mobile equipment, which
clearly includes a vehicle coming within OCGA § 33-24-51(b)." Id ..
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mates.7 6 Thus, the county bore liability (to the extent of the insurance) for its officer's negligent supervision and for "the failure of other
inmates
to remove the coil of barbed wire from the path of the bush
277
hog."

Other efforts at avoiding county immunity sounded in inverse
condemnation and constitutional tort. The inverse condemnation
venture drew short shrift from the court of appeals in ParianLodge, Inc.
v. DeKalb County 7 ' a claim for "just compensation" arising out of a
property valuation disagreement. "[Plaintiff] has failed to cite any
authority permitting a taxpayer to file a cause of action for just
compensation due to a tax assessment valuation dispute."2 79
The constitutional tort assertion, an alleged violation of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 ("Section 1983"),2so surfaced in several contexts. Thomas v.
DeKalb County251 featured a claim for alleged mistreatment by county
paramedics responding to an emergency call. 82 Holding no federalright infringements, the court of appeals found necessary evidence

276. Id. at 554, 494 S.E.2d at 367. The court held the plaintiff was not a county
"employee" within a policy exclusion; rather, he was "an involuntary servant." Id. at 553,
494 S.E.2d at 367. Further, "the negligence of the other prisoners in failing to discover and
remove the wire, as well as the negligent supervision by [the officer] of the prisoners and
to discover and remove the wire himself comes within the use and operation of the insured
vehicle." Id. at 553 n.2, 494 S.E.2d at 366 n.2.
277. Id. at 555, 494 S.E.2d at 368. The court reversed the trial judge's summary
judgment for the county. Id.
278. 225 Ga. App. 853, 485 S.E.2d 545 (1997). Plaintiff obtained the property by
foreclosure in 1991, paid the 1990 ad valorem taxes without protest, and later claimed a
refund representing the difference between taxes paid on the 1990 fair market value and
taxes which would have been owing on the 1991 reduced fair market value, Id. at 853, 485
S.E.2d at 546. The court held plaintiffs claim not cognizable as a refund action. Id. at
855, 485 S.E.2d at 547.
279. Id. at 855-56, 485 S.E.2d at 548. Therefore, "[N]o legal basis exists for [plaintiffs]
claim that its payment of the tax resulted in an unconstitutional taking of its property
without just compensation." Id. at 856, 485 S.E.2d at 548. The court thus affirmed the
trial judge's grant of the county's motion to dismiss. Id.
280. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). This federal statute imposes civil liability on "persons"
acting under color of state law or custom who deprive others of a constitutional or statutory
right. For background on and analysis of the "constitutional tort," see R. PERRY SENTELL,
JR., GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW'S ASSIMILATION OF Monell: SECTION 1983 AND THE
NEw "PERSONS," (1984); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government and ConstitutionalTorts:
In the Georgia Courts, 49 MERCER L. REV. 1 (1997).
281. 227 Ga. App. 186, 489 S.E.2d 58 (1997).
282. Id. at 187, 489 S.E.2d at 60. The paramedics responded to an emergency call at
plaintiffs home; plaintiff became unresponsive while being transported to the ambulance
and died a week later at the hospital. Id. at 187-88, 489 S.E.2d at 60.
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lacking that the county created 2the
emergency or that plaintiff was "in
3
the county's custody or control." 1
Federal tort claims emanating from county law enforcement activities
fared no better. In Thompson v. Chapel,'" 4 plaintiff sued for the
county's failure to adequately supervise a police officer who murdered
plaintiff's mother." 5 Plaintiff offered evidence of four prior instances
of the officer's questionable conduct. ' The court could not see "how
these disparate incidents 'caused' the alleged constitutional deprivations,
much less constituted a 'policy.'"287 None of the "events" showed "the
requisite deliberate indifference to citizens' rights," ' nor did they
"rise to the level of customs or policies."25 9
The court likewise discounted the alleged misconduct in Webb v.
Carroll County,2 9 an inmate's action for county failure to provide
protective goggles or prompt medical care for a work-related injury.29'
Summarily rejecting claims under the Eighth Amendment and Section
1983, the court emphasized a requirement of "'obduracy and wantonness,

283. Id. at 191, 489 S.E.2d at 62. The court affirmed a grant of summary judgment for
the county under section 1983. Id. Regarding plaintiffs state law claims, the court
examined O.C.G.A. section 31-11-8(a), granting civil immunity to persons licensed to
furnish ambulance services who, without remuneration, render emergency care in good
faith. The court held that defendants were properly licensed, that a county fee to defray
a part of the cost of the services did not constitute "remuneration," and that defendants
rendered the services to plaintiff in good faith. Id. at 189, 489 S.E.2d at 61. On the latter
issue, the court examined the evidence on both sides and reasoned that its "entirety ...
shows that [the] ... actions taken by the defendants, were all directed at saving
[plaintiffs] life." Id. at 190, 489 S.E.2d at 62. This was true even though "hindsight might
show that some things could have been done differently." Id. Accordingly, the court
concluded, under the emergency care immunity statute, defendants were entitled to
summary judgment on plaintiffs state law claims. Id. at 191, 489 S.E.2d at 62.
284. 229 Ga. App. 537, 494 S.E.2d 216 (1997).
285. The officer had been convicted for the murder. Id. at 537, 494 S.E.2d at 217.
286. These included a suspect score on a psychological test, a garnishment of wages for
child support, allegations of a robbery conspiracy, and allegations of keeping confiscated
weapons. Id. at 538, 494 S.E.2d at 217.
287. Id. The court noted the officer's receipt of commendations and citations and the
unproven nature of the allegations against him. Id.
288. Id., 494 S.E.2d at 218. The court observed that Section 1983 liability does not
impose respondeat superior liability nor does it reach negligent or unintentional customs
or policies. Id. at 538, 494 S.E.2d at 217.
289. Id. at 539, 494 S.E.2d at 218. The court affirmed summary judgment for the
county. Id.
290. 229 Ga. App. 584, 494 S.E.2d 196 (1997).
291. Id. at 584, 494 S.E.2d at 197. Plaintiff prisoner alleged injury while working with
equipment at the county correctional institute. Id.
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not inadvertence or error in good faith.'"292 The plaintiff's claims, the
court insisted, "fail to reach this standard."29 3
A Section 1983 employment claim failed the plaintiff in Board of
294 There, the former
Commissioners of Effingham County v. Farmer.
county administrator charged the commissioners with procedural due
process violations in terminating his employment.295 In structuring its
analytical "legal framework,"296 the court found that "[tihe Commissioners' action was random and unauthorized as opposed to action resulting
from adherence to established governmental procedure." 297 In that
setting, "an adequate post-deprivation remedy would provide the
requisite procedural due process."29 Because "[t]he state courts of
Georgia provided an adequate post-deprivation remedy,"299 the court
appellant Board complete
concluded, the trial judge erred in "denying
30 0
summary judgment on the § 1983 claim."

Claimants frequently sought recovery from individual county officers
and employees, thus drawing defendants' invocations of "official
immunity."3"' As derived from Georgia's 1991 constitutional amend-

292. Id. (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1985)).
293. Id. at 585, 494 S.E.2d at 198. "Accordingly, the trial court did not err by granting
summary judgment to [defendants] on [plaintiffs] claims under the Eighth Amendment and
42 U.S.C. § 1983." Id.
294. 228 Ga. App. 819, 493 S.E.2d 21 (1997).
295. Id. at 819, 493 S.E.2d at 24. The commissioners adopted a motion to terminate
plaintiffs employment, sent him a notice of termination listing five reasons and informing
him of his right to appeal to the board, conducted a public hearing, and reaffirmed in
writing his dismissal. Id. at 820, 493 S.E.2d at 24.
296. Id. at 821, 493 S.E.2d at 25.
"In this context, the individual Commissioner's ability to foresee the
297. Id.
deprivation is of no consequence; the proper inquiry is whether the state is in a position
to provide for pre-deprivation process, under the attendant situation ...,and we find it
was not." Id.
298. Id. "The burden is on the plaintiff to plead and prove that the State did not
provide him with an adequate post-deprivation remedy." Id. at 822, 493 S.E.2d at 26.
299. Id. at 823, 493 S.E.2d at 26. The court reasoned that all plaintiffs claims "could
be addressed before a court of this state had [plaintiff] chosen to utilize this available
postdeprivational judicial remedy." Id.
300. Id. Additionally, the court held, the individual commissioners enjoyed qualified
immunity under Section 1983. Id. at 823-24, 493 S.E.2d at 27. At the time of termination,
"there existed no law in concrete and factually defined context that would have compelled
the Board to conclude that its actions violated federal law in the existing circumstances
....
" Id. at 824, 493 S.E.2d at 27.
301. "Sovereign" or "governmental" immunity protects the local government's purse,
and "official" immunity protects officials and employees in their individual capacities so
that responsible persons will fill public positions. See R. Perry Sentell, Jr., GeorgiaLocal
Government Officers: Rights for Their Wrongs, 13 GA. L. REV. 747 (1979); R. Perry Sentell,
Jr., Individual Liability in Georgia Local Government Law: The Haunting Hiatus of
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ment, °2 official immunity turns upon whether the offending conduct
is deemed "ministerial" (liability for negligence). 3 or "discretionary"
(liability only for wilfulness)." 4 The court of appeals was called to
draw this line in several instances.
Apparently of the "discretionary" persuasion, Diaz v. Gwinnett
County 5 featured a police officer's complaint that his supervisors
failed to provide him vaccination against Hepatitis B. 30 ' Rejecting the
claim, the court was adamant: "Inasmuch as the record contains no
wilfully, or corruptly, there
evidence that [defendants] acted maliciously,
307
was no waiver of their official immunity."
However, the same could not be said in Simmons v. Coweta Coun305
ty
of a correctional officer's directing inmates in clearing debris from
a roadside. 0 9 That conduct "involves no discretion and was ministerial
in nature as a matter of law."310 Thus, the officer's "acts or omissions
in supervising inmates were subject to tort liability."31 A similar
approach yielded a similar result in Seay v. Cleveland."2 There,

Hennessy, 40 MERCER L. REV. 27 (1988); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government Tort
Liability: The Summer of '92, 9 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 405 (1993).
302. GA. CONST. art. I, § II, para. IX(d). The leading decision on the issue remains,
however, Hennessy v. Webb, 245 Ga. 329, 264 S.E.2d 878 (1980).
303. An act that is "simple, absolute, definite," and "requiring merely the execution of
a specific duty." See, e.g., Joyce v. Van Arsdale, 196 Ga. App. 95, 395 S.E.2d 275 (1990).
304. An act calling for the exercise of "'personal deliberation and judgment'" and
manifested in actions "'not specifically directed.'" Id. at 96, 395 S.E.2d at 276 (citations
omitted).
305. 225 Ga. App. 807, 485 S.E.2d 42 (1997).
306. Id. at 807, 485 S.E.2d at 43. Plaintiff alleged that he contracted the virus in his
undercover narcotics investigation work and sued defendants "in their individual and
official capacities" for failing to provide or seek county funding for hepatitis vaccinations.
Id.
307. Id. at 809, 485 S.E.2d at 44. The court affirmed summary judgment for
defendants. Id.
308. 229 Ga. App. 550, 494 S.E.2d 362 (1997).
309. Id. at 550-51, 494 S.E.2d at 365. While operating a bush hog on the roadside,
plaintiff inmate was struck by a piece of wire that the clearing crew had failed to remove
and sued defendant for negligent supervision. Id. at 551, 494 S.E.2d at 365.
310. Id. at 554, 494 S.E.2d at 367.
311. Id. The court thus reversed the trial judge's grant of summary judgment for the
officer. Id. at 555, 494 S.E.2d at 368. Contrarily, the court did classify as "discretionary"
(hence, no liability) the conduct of the county warden in charge of the prison. Id.
Even "ministerial" conduct only entails liability for negligence; the officer is not rendered
an insurer. For instance, in Brown v. Hines, 230 Ga. App. 103, 495 S.E.2d 592 (1998), the
court conceded that the correctional officer's duty to replace stop signs is 'ministerial" once
the official receives notice that the sign is missing. Id. at 103, 495 S.E.2d at 593. There,
however, no evidence revealed such notice, and the officer was not responsible for an
intersection collision. Id. at 104, 495 S.E.2d at 593.
312. 228 Ga. App. 836, 493 S.E.2d 30 (1997).
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purchasers of property at a sheriff's sale sued the sheriff for failing to
properly apply sile proceeds to satisfy superior liens on the property
purchased.313 Sketching statutory requirements for sheriff's sales,3 14
15
the court found that the sheriff enjoyed no discretion in the matter
31 6
and that he had thus "forfeited" his official immunity.

In both medical and educational contexts, the court reverted to the
317
"discretionary function" classification. Schulze v. DeKalb County
presented a claim against county paramedics for delaying plaintiff's
transportation to the hospital in order to arrange care for her small
child. 8 As a result, plaintiff alleged, her second child suffered serious
birth defects. 319 Affirming a judgment of official immunity,
the court
320
designated the paramedics' actions "clearly discretionary."
The court responded similarly in Crisp County School System v.
Brown,32 a student's personal injury action against a physical education instructor. The student complained that the instructor insisted that
she attempt to traverse monkey bars and that she was injured in the

313. Id. at 836, 493 S.E.2d at 31. Plaintiffs purchased a home at the sheriffs sale, and
because funds therefrom were not applied to an existing superior lien on the home,
plaintiffs were forced'.either to pay off the loans or lose both the property and their
investment. Id. at 836-37, 493 S.E.2d at 31.
314. O.C.G.A. § 9-13-60(c) (1993).
315. "This statutory mandate allows no discretion on the part of the sheriff or his
employees regarding how to disperse the funds acquired during a sheriffs sale. The act
is mandatory and not directory." 228 Ga. App. at 838, 493 S.E.2d at 32. Thus, the sheriff,
"through his employees, had negligently performed statutorily-defined administerial
.
functions." Id.
316. Id. at 839, 493 S.E.2d at 32. The sheriff "was not entitled to the protections of
sovereign immunity under the 1991 constitutional amendment," and the court affirmed the
trial judge in directing a verdict for plaintiffs. Id. at 838, 493 S.E.2d at 32. Additionally,
the court held that the sheriff "was subject to suit on his Sheriffs bond, an action which
is ex contractu and therefore outside of the protection of sovereign immunity." Id. at 839,
493 S.E.2d at 33. For specific treatment of Georgia law on the bond liability of local
government officials, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Georgia Local Government Officers: Rights
for Their Wrongs, 13-GA. L. REV. 747 (1979).
317. 230 Ga. App. 305, 496 S.E.2d 273 (1998).
318. The paramedics responded to plaintiffs call, arrived at her house at 8:23 A.M.,
where they found her bleeding, and found her small child present in the house. They
arranged care for the child and had plaintiff admitted to the hospital at 9:00 A.M. Id. at
306, 496 S.E.2d at 275:
319. Id. at 305, 496 S.E.2d at 274-75.
320. Id. at 308,496 S.E.2d at 276. "They exercised personal deliberation and judgment
in delaying transportation of [plaintiff] to the hospital for several minutes to make certain
that the small child would not be left home alone." Id. Because there was no allegation
or evidence of wilfulnqss, "they are afforded official immunity." Id.
321. 226 Ga. App. 800, 487 S.E.2d 512 (1997).
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effort.322 Once again, the court was unrelenting: "The decisions and
acts of [the instructor], regarding the degree of monitoring, supervision
and control which he exercised over his student ... were discretionary
functions."323

G. Zoning
County rezoning litigation found exemplification in Gwinnett County
v. Davis, " a constitutional attack upon a zoning classification. 25
In order to succeed, the supreme court elaborated, plaintiff must show
by "clear and convincing evidence" a "significant detriment" from the
zoning classification and its "insubstantial relationship" to the public
interest.3 2 Because plaintiffs evidence showed "merely" that the
property "is not presently zoned for its highest and best use,"327 the
Accordingly, the court
court found no "significant detriment."32
asserted, the trial court had reached an "erroneous legal conclusion"
when it invalidated the classification. 29

322. Id. at 800, 487 S.E.2d at 514. The defendant had instructed his class to complete
an obstacle course which required them to traverse monkey bars. When plaintiff student

told him she did not think she could cross the bars, the defendant instructed her to try.
Plaintiff fell from the bars breaking her arm. Id.
323. Id. at 803, 487 S.E.2d at 516. In the absence of wilfulness, defendant "was
entitled to assert the defense of official immunity and to summary judgment regarding any
claims averred against him in his private (individual) capacity." Id. at 804, 487 S.E.2d at
516.
324. 268 Ga. 653, 492 S.E.2d 523 (1997).
325. Plaintiffs sought rezoning from "residential" to "residential lakeside," as well as
a special use permit for operation of a boat storage facility. Id. at 653, 492 S.E.2d at 52425.
326. Id. at 653-54, 492 S.E.2d at 525. Although plaintiffs need not show that the
classification rendered their property "totally useless" for its zoned purpose, they must
demonstrate a "significant loss" unjustified by any resulting public benefit. Id. at 654, 492
S.E.2d at 525.
327. Id. "[Tihe trial court relied solely on evidence that the property 'as zoned is worth
substantially less than it would be if it were zoned [residential lakeside] and it had a
special use permit for a boat storage facility.'" Id.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 655, 492 S.E.2d at 526. "However, the trial court would be authorized to
conclude that the [plaintiffs] had suffered a significant detriment from the present R-100
classification if it finds clear and convincing evidence of a substantial decrease in the value
of [plaintiffs'] property for its R-100 use." Id. at 654, 492 S.E.2d at 525. Thus, the court
vacated the judgment and remanded the case for the trial court's reconsideration under
this latter standard. Id. at 655, 492 S.E.2d at 526.
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Authorities

A member of a county development authority found himself the target
of a quo warranto proceeding in Maddox v. Schrader3 ° because he did
not reside in the district he was appointed to serve.331 In response,
defendant argued that although the applicable local statute332 required
initially appointed members to serve specified districts, it imposed no
such requirement for successors. 33s
Rejecting that position, the
supreme court employed "that rule of statutory construction which
requires courts to construe language in one part of a statute in light of
the legislature's intent as found in the statute as a whole." 334 So
construed, the statute "requir[ed] Authority members to reside within
the commissioner district to which they are appointed to serve"33 5 and
mandated defendant's removal from the authority.
I.

Legal Organ

A local newspaper's designation as the county's "official organ" carries
a significant distinction: that publication serves as the exclusive official
link between the citizens and their various local officials. Designation
requirements mandate that the subject newspaper has published
continuously for two years and has maintained an eighty-five percentpaid-subscription rate for the previous twelve months. 336 The designation determination is vested in a majority of the probate judge, the

330. 268 Ga. 661, 492 S.E.2d 521 (1997). For extensive examination of the historic role
of the writ of quo warranto in local government administration, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR.,
THE WRIT OF Quo WARRANTO IN GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAw (1987).
331. Defendant was appointed to the authority by the county commissioner from the
third district; defendant was a county resident but not a resident of the third district. 268
Ga. at 661, 492 S.E.2d at 522.
332. 1965 Ga. Laws 4123. The court explained that "tbecause [the county's]
Development Authority traces its roots to a constitutional amendment found at Ga. L.
1966, p.853, the general proscriptions in the Development Authorities' Law, OCGA § 36-621 et seq., regarding county development authorities do not apply." 268 Ga. at 661 n.2, 492
S.E.2d at 522 n.2.
333. Id. at 661, 492 S.E.2d at 522. Defendant "contends that the trial court erred by
transposing the residency requirement for this transitional period to the local act's
successor clause . . . ." Id. at 662, 492 S.E.2d at 522.
334. Id. at 663, 492 S.E.2d at 523. For discussion and analysis of the in pari materia
rule of statutory construction in the Georgia appellate courts, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR.,
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION IN GEORGIA: THE DOCTRINE OF In Pari Materia (1996),
reprinted in R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., STUDIES IN GEORGIA STATUTORY LAW 259 (1997).
335. 268 Ga. at 663, 492 S.E.2d at 523.
336. O.C.G.A. § 9-13-142(a) (1993 & Supp. 1998).
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sheriff, and the clerk of superior court. 3 7 The designation process
becomes the occasional focus of heated litigation.
Atlanta Journal v.- Clarke... featured the effort by one newspaper to
replace another as "official organ" on grounds that the latter publication's paid subscriptions no longer totaled eighty-five percent of its
circulation. 39 In response, the supreme court held the requirement to
turn only upon time of designation.34 ° "[O]nce a newspaper has been
designated official organ, that status ...is not open to challenge on the
ground that its paid circulation has dropped below the statutory
requirement."341' The three designating officials exercise "an extremely
broad discretion" and bear no duty to monitor continuing qualification
compliance.342 Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial judge's dismissal of plaintiff's effort at replacement. 4

337. Id. § 9-13-142(b). The probate judge is required to report annually to the secretary
of state, giving the name and address of the organ or any changes in designation. Id. § 913-142(d).
338. 269 Ga. 33, 497 S.E.2d 358 (1998).
339. Id. at 33, 497 S.E.2d at 358. Plaintiff alleged that the designated organ had,
subsequent to its designation, deliberately reduced its paid circulation, and plaintiff sought
to mandamus the designating officials to make the replacement. Id. at 33-34, 497 S.E.2d
at 358-59.
340. Id. at 34, 497 S.E.2d at 359. "Nowhere in the Code section are the designating
officials given any responsibility for monitoring continuing qualification." Id. Although a
1997 amendment to the statute required that the paper must have maintained the 85%paid-circulation rate for twelve months prior to its designation, that amendment does not
"place a new duty on the designating officials to ensure that the standards are met at any
time other than when the newspaper is first designated as the official organ." Id. at 34-35,
497 S.E.2d at 359.
341. Id. at 35, 497 S.E.2d at 359. The court conceded that "compelling policy considerations" augured for continuing qualification, "but under the present language of the statute,
there simply is no such requirement." Id.
342. Id., 497 S.E.2d at 360.
343. Id. In a second case of the period, Southern Crescent Newspapers v. Dorsey, 269
Ga. 41, 497 S.E.2d 360 (1998), a former legal organ protested the change to a new designee

on grounds that the 1997 amendment to the material statute, requiring the 85%-paidcirculation rate for the previous twelve months, became effective prior to the change. Id.
at 41, 497 S.E.2d at 361. Rejecting that argument, the supreme court held that the new
designation was made on April 4, 1997, and that the amendment to the statute did not
occur until April 14, 1997. Id. at 41-42, 497 S.E.2d at 361. The fact that the amendment
occurred prior to the new designee's commencing to publish legal notices was immaterial.
"[T]he official action required by the Code to effectuate a change in legal organs was
completed before the legislature added the new criterion for legal organs." Id. at 45, 497
S.E.2d at 363. A dissenting opinion for three justices viewed the amendment to apply to
the designation in issue. Id. at 49, 497 S.E.2d at 366.
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LEGISLATION

The 1998 General Assembly acted upon a number of local government
issues; a few examples illustrate coverage.
Efforts at resolving city-county annexation tensions resulted in two
measures. First, if the county raises a land use dispute regarding an
annexation, that dispute must be resolved prior to the annexation's
completion;'" moreover, the municipal zoning process for the subject
property must be substantially completed prior to final annexation.3 45
Second, if the city and county have a common zoning ordinance, then
annexed land is zoned as it was prior to the annexation, 46 and any
deannexed property is zoned as it was prior to the deannexation"'
The Zoning Procedures Law" now includes the local government's
consideration of requests for special use permits. 49 That expansion
enables the local government to limit the time to
ten minutes per side
350
for arguments for and against a permit request.
Local government officers and employees encountered new legislative
prohibitions. Employees are now prohibited from striking. 5 ' Violation
entails termination of employment and forfeiture of civil service status,
job rights, and seniority, as well as ineligibility for public employment
for three years.352 The officers and employees of local government
authorities are now prohibited from selling property to the authority
unless the value is less than $200 per quarter or the sale is made
pursuant to sealed bids.353
Accountability exactions drew legislative attention in several contexts.
For instance, a superior court may now review the grounds for a recall
petition to determine the presence of a factual basis. 3 ' As for "open-

344. Ga. H.R. Bill 1603, Reg. Sess. (1998) (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 36-36-2, -11, 36-66-4).
The county can dispute the land use only if the proposed change results in a substantial
change in the intensity of the allowable use of the property or in a change to a significantly
different allowable use.
345. Id.
346. Ga. S. Bill 600, Reg. Sess. (1998) (codified at O.C.G.A. § 36-66-4).
347. Id.
348. O.C.G.A. §§ 36-66-1 to -5 (1993 & Supp. 1998).
349. Ga. S. Bill 573, Reg. Sess. (1998) (codified at O.C.G.A. § 36-66-3).
350. Id.
351. Ga. H.R. Bill 1373, Reg. Sess. (1998) (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 45-19-1 to -5).
352. Id. A nonpublic employee who attempts to entice a public employee to strike is
guilty of a misdemeanor. This prohibition previously applied only to state employees.
353. Ga. H.R. Bill 1542, Reg. Sess. (1998) (codified at O.C.G.A. § 16-10-6).
354. Ga. H.R. Bill 942, Reg. Sess. (1998) (codified at O.C.G.A. § 21-4-6). The officer
sought to be recalled may appeal the determination to the supreme court, but the appeal
will not stay the recall proceedings.
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ness" concerns, the state attorney general may now independently bring
civil and criminal enforcement actions for violations of the Open
Meetings Act355 and pursue civil actions to enforce the Open Records
35 6
Law.
The legislature confronted a major problem with the state revenue
commissioner's distribution to local governments of the proceeds from
special local option sales taxes. The commissioner may now distribute
previously "unprocessable" or "unattributable" proceeds based upon a pro
rata share formula.5 7
A local government's acceptance of such
distributions will preclude a claim for additional past proceeds."' As
for expenditures, local governments may now utilize special local option
sales tax proceeds to purchase voting equipment.35 9
Local governments were the recipients of additional powers from the
1998 legislature but also suffered the imposition of new obligations.
From the power perspective, cities and counties are authorized to build
toll roads or bridges and to contract with private interests for construction of the projects. 6 ° Additionally, local governments are empowered
to contract with private parties for up to ten years for the government's
provision of gas, electricity, or water. 361 Finally, in the interest of
growth management, the legislature authorized local governments to
establish procedures and standards for the transfer of development
rights within their jurisdictions. 62
On the duty side of the ledger, local governments must now provide
(on request) Hepatitis C vaccinations and screenings to their public
safety employees.3 6 Additionally, cities and counties are required to
post signs on bridges in their respective road systems which provide
information on maximum safe load, weight, and other vehicle dimen-

355. Ga. H.R. Bill 1549, Reg. Sess. (1998) (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 50-14-5, 50-18-73).
356. Id.
357. Ga. H.R. Bill 1784, Reg. Sess. (1998) (codified at O.C.G.A. § 48-8-67).
358. Id. The statute requires the revenue department to provide information
concerning the distribution of the proceeds in the fashion authorized.
359. Ga. H.R. Bill 1467, Reg. Sess. (1998) (codified at O.C.G.A. § 48-8-111).
360. Ga. H.R. Bill 1486, Reg. Sess. (1998) (codified at O.C.G.A. § 36-60-19).
361. Ga. H.R. Bill 1160, Reg. Sess. (1998) (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 36-1-26, 36-30-3, 3680-17).
362. Ga. H.R. Bill 1540, Reg. Sess. (1998) (codified at O.C.G.A. § 36-66A-1, -2). The
statute provides for notice and provides that any proposed transfers of development rights
are subject to the approval of affected property owners and shall be subject to a separate
vote by the local governing authority.
363. Ga. H.R. Bill 1410, Reg. Sess. (1998) (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 31-33-7, 31-35-1, -3).
The statute mandates that after payment for the vaccinations by third parties, insurers,
or the like, the local government is responsible for any remaining cost.
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sions." The mandating statute provides for weight limits, signs, and
citations for violations.365
More prohibition than duty, the local
government may no longer require that an applicant for an alcoholic
beverage license be a local government resident if the applicant
designates a resident who will be responsible for any matter relating to
the license.6
Finally, anticipated technological problems concurrent with "Year
2000" prompted a legislative grant of immunity to state and local
governments.6 7 Thus, the government is excused for losses from
malfunctions caused directly or indirectly by the failure of computers to
accurately process dates or times."'
IV.

CONCLUSION

As reflected by its origins, the "law" of local government develops
apace. This year's developments counsel caution in the painstaking
process of accommodation-accommodating the ends of those who govern
with the means of those whom are governed.

364. Ga. H.R. Bill 1470, Reg. Sess. (1998) (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 32-4-41, -91, 32-6-26,
-27, -50).
365. Id. I.e., violations on the part of persons violating the posted requirements.
366. Ga. S. Bill 111, Reg. Sess. (1998) (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 3-3-2, -21).
367. Ga. S. Bill 638, Reg. Sess. (1998) (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 36-60-19, 50-21-24). The
immunity granted is for malfunctions occurring before December 31, 2005.
368. Id. The immunity requires that the malfunction causing the loss be unforeseeable.

